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The international politics of Spanish accession to NATO.

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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF
SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO

by

Edward McKim Sniffin

March 1982

Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost

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The thesis discusses the interaction of interests in each relationship, and the effects of each issue on the accession process. Conclusions are drawn regarding the probable resolution of each issue if Spain is fully integrated into NATO, and possible implications of each relationship for long term Alliance cohesion are discussed.

The International Politics of Spanish Accession to NATO

by

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requirements for the degree of

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE SETTING

The accession process which will bring Spain full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is nearly complete. Ratification of the protocol of accession by NATO's fifteen member states will mark the completion of a major phase in the Spanish Government's program to move Spain into a role as a full partner in the community of Western European nations. For Spain, association with "the democratic alliance" will demonstrate to the world the depth of the nation's commitment to democratic government. Accession also will bespeak recognition by other European states of Spain's legitimate place in the Western community, recognition which was withheld during the long rule of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. The majority Union del Centro Democratica party is counting on the prestige associated with this recognition to generate the domestic support it needs to retain control of the government and to press ahead with its other programs.

Spanish accession also will have strategic and political advantages for the alliance. Spain's dominant position in Iberia, fronting both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, will shore up NATO's weak southern flank and help secure control of the approaches to the Mediterranean and central Europe from North America and the South Atlantic. Incorporation of Spain into NATO plans for the defense of Europe will add significantly to the strategic depth available for theater ground and air operations. The Spanish Armed Forces will add over 300,000 men

to NATO manpower roles. Although not equipped with the most modern weapons, the Spanish Army is the fourth largest in Western Europe. The air and naval forces, more moderate in size, operate with better equipment and are capable of making an immediate contribution to NATO defense. Pernaps even more important will be the psychological lift which Spanish accession will bring to an alliance which many see as troubled and ineffective.

Yet, despite the apparent advantages for both Spain and NATO, the accession process has not proceeded without difficulties. The key to understanding these difficulties lies in knowing the type of association which NATO represents, and the historical relationships between the Alliance partners. This essay does not discuss all of the international political issues which have been raised during the accession process; instead, it focuses at some length on four of the key bilateral relationships involved, and examines in detail the effect of each on the complex multilateral process. However, before presenting the four relationships chosen for study, a brief discussion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the evolution of the accession process is in order.

B. WHAT IS NATO?

Some have proclaimed that NATO represents more than a mere military coalition. They assert that NATO represents the embodiment of ideals of Western interdependence which transcend defense requirements to include a common economic and cultural heritage, and, most importantly, a tradition of democratic government. Some see in the North Atlantic Council a forum for the formulation of a consensus on foreign policy which will serve as the common expression of that democratic tradition.

They seek to make NATO a supranational organization which transcends the politics of nationalism and replaces them with the ideals of Western democracy. But in fact, initially NATO did not intend to be all of these things, nor have the Allies been able to achieve the high degree of consensus implied by these ideals.

First and foremost, NATO is a security alliance. The opening sentences of the explanation of the Organization found in the NATO Handbook read as follows:

> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization serves a defensive Alliance which maintains military preparedness in order to prevent war. It is an intergovernmental, not a supranational organization, in which member states retain their full sovereignty and independence. The political task of NATO is to provide for consultation on all political problems of relevance to its members or to the Alliance as a whole and give direction to the military side of the Organization. [Ref. 1]

The operative phrases in this description are "intergovernmental" and "consultation". The former stresses that the Alliance is a free association of sovereign states which retain, and are expected to exercise, their full prerogatives regarding issues which affect their national interests. There is no requirement, legal or moral, for Alliance members to form and adhere to consensus positions regarding issues of common interest. The latter phrase prescribes the limits of the Alliance's political functions: i.e., to provide a forum for consultation regarding issues of common interest. The North Atlantic Council is not a democratic institution in the sense that a majority may formulate policy for the whole. It is merely a forum for consultation. Each state must act independently to form its own policy on every issue.

Every attempt to expand the scope of Western political collaboration has failed. Canadian proposals that the original North Atlantic Treaty include provisions for cultural, economic, and social cooperation were rejected and replaced by the more nebulous provisions of Article 2, which merely provide that one objective of the Organization will be the encouragement of economic collaboration.

De Gaulle's September 1958 proposal for a directorate composed of France, Britain, and the United States to shape common Western policy was rejected. So too were Henry Kissinger's 1965 proposals for the creation of a political body to shape "a common foreign policy" for the Atlantic community. [Ref. 2]

Although each member nation recognizes the value of the security guarantee offered by the Alliance, none has ever been anxious to surrender its option for independent decisionmaking. This reluctance can be found even in Article 5, the operative article of the NATO security agreement, with regard to common military action. Contrary to widely held belief, Article 5 does not require military action by all members in response to an attack on any one. Rather, the article provides that "each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith . . . <u>such action as it deems necessary</u> . . . to restore the security of the North Atlantic area". [Ref. 3] Even in the area of security, national prerogatives are maintained.

C. PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE COHESION

For the most part, the Alliance continues to perform well in its primary function as a security pact. But as a forum for shaping a Western policy consensus on any issue it must be remembered that,

even at best, common policy will be a compromise between optimum security considerations and minimum political autonomy. In The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance, Cottrell and Dougherty point out that:

> . . . even the staunchest allies can at times disagree rather seriously over political objectives and approaches; this is to be accepted. All the NATO members have behind them long and proud national traditions. All of them are jealous of their national sovereign prerogatives. [Ref. 4]

Cottrell and Dougherty go on to compare the Alliance states with U.S. political parties, where each is beset by frequently conflicting desires to cooperate so as to achieve common goals while simultaneously seeking to avoid any sacrifice of individual interest or identity.

Historically, the member states of NATO have placed their own political interests above common security interests. An early illustration of this phenomenon is found in the search for a formula for the rearmament of Germany following World War II. It was only extreme pressure (coupled with reassurances) from the Americans and the British which persuaded the French to accept German rearmament and accession to NATO following the failure of the European Defense Community proposals. Disagreements concerning the timing and manner of terminating European colonialism created great rifts in the fabric of the Alliance. The French were particularly perturbed about the failure of their allies to provide moral and material backing for their involvement in Indo-China and, later, Algeria. In the 1970's, Portugal was faced with the loss of its colonies in Africa and, as before, received no support from the Alliance. Such a list of issues of contention could be extended indefinitely. The "Cod Wars" between Iceland and Britain, the Greek-Turkish disputes and the conflict over Cyprus, American involvement

in Vietnam, inconsistent policies concerning Western support for Israel, failure to implement coherent energy and nuclear weapons strategies, and failure to form a common response to events in Afghanistan and Poland loom as major examples.

As long as the perception of military threat remains low, there is no reason to believe that the nations of NATO will not continue to behave as individual actors rather than as a unit in shaping foreign policy. Understanding this central fact regarding the relationships of the member states of the Alliance is central to understanding the problems which arise around every major issue which NATO faces. Only in exceptional cases will the interests of even a majority of the states exactly coincide. The question of Spanish accession has been no exception.

D. STAGES IN THE ACCESSION PROCESS

Under the dictatorial government of Francisco Franco, Spain was a political outcast in postwar Europe. Although NATO membership was periodically proposed by the United States for purely pragmatic reasons, the liberal, protestant states in Scandinavia and the Low Countries were emphatic in their opposition to membership for Fascist Spain. Only Portugal, under the dictatorship of Salazar, joined the United States in support for Spanish accession. That the Portuguese themselves had been invited to join the Alliance was a close question. Had the United States not insisted that the Portuguese Azores were absolutely critical to the security of the Atlantic link, even Portugal's West-leaning neutrality during World War II would not have secured her membership over the objections of Alliance liberals. Spain, on the other hand, had no such strategic monopoly to use as bargaining leverage, and

Franco's close association with Hitler both before and during the war absolutely confirmed Spain's isolation.

With the death of Franco in November 1975, Spain began a transition toward democratic government. Under the leadership of King Juan Carlos I and his Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, the nation moved quickly to break from the dictatorial traditions of the previous 36 years. Elections held in 1977 confirmed the King's appointment of Suarez as Prime Minister and brought a coalition of the moderate political center, the Union del Centro Democratica (UCD), into power as the majority party in government. Another election in March 1979, three months after the adoption of the new democratic constitution, reconfirmed the UCD's position.

The keystone of Suarez' foreign policy was the full integration of Spain into the Western community of nations. The major milestones in achieving this goal were to be membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Membership in the EEC was the first objective, for this initiative enjoyed broad support by all of Spain's major political parties, including the Communists. Membership in NATO was approached much more cautiously, for it was opposed by both the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) and the recently legalized Communist Party of Spain (PCE). The NATO issue was viewed as potentially destabilizing by Spain's Government, which wished to consolidate its position before undertaking any controversial programs.

Spain submitted its formal application for EEC membership in July 1977, with the hope that it would receive quick and favorable consideration. But the process has been much slower than expected, and negotiations are still not completed on the question of Spanish entry. Problems

center around French and Italian concern for the impact of Spanish agricultural goods on their domestic markets, around the allocation of Atlantic fishing quotas, and around the failure of Spain to complete the internal currency and taxation reforms (particularly the Value Added Tax) necessary to comply with EEC standards.

Application for membership in NATO remained a more distant goal of the Suarez government. The Prime Minister was most concerned about pursuing an objective which was sure to be politically divisive at a time when cooperation between the nation's dominant political parties was essential to the resolution of the immediate problems of regional autonomy and democratic reform. No imminent threat to Spanish security made immediate Alliance membership imperative, and Spain already had a bilateral agreement with the United States which, although not a firm written commitment, the Spanish believed would oblige the U.S. to aid in the defense of Spain against outside agression. Suarez initially maintained that membership in NATO should follow membership in the EEC, but as the EEC negotiations dragged out it was announced that Spain might apply to NATO as early as 1981, with membership expected in 1983. This announcement came from the office of the Foreign Minister, but was never confirmed by the Prime Minister's office. [Ref. 5]

Two events in early 1981 dramatically changed the course of Spanish foreign policy. The first was the resignation of Adolfo Suarez and the nomination of the more conservative Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as his successor. The second was the coup attempt of February 23. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, subsequent events revealed that Colonel Tejero's perniciousness represented only the leading edge of much

broader discontent among the nation's powerful conservatives. The main focus of the discontent was what the conservatives perceived as government "softness" on autonomy issues and regional terrorism, but there was general nationwide dissatisfaction with increasing lawlessness and a breakdown of traditional family and Church authority.

Calvo-Sotelo feared that conservative reaction represented a real threat to the stability of the democracy, yet he depended on a political alliance with the conservative Popular Alliance to maintain his parliamentary majority. Restrained therefore from moving directly against the military, which was the base of conservative power, Calvo-Sotelo sought a diversionary strategy, a means of redirecting military attention away from the internal affairs of the state. Membership in NATO offered such a diversion.

Calvo-Sotelo announced his intention to accelerate the accession process in his confirmation speech to the Cortes. In June the Prime Minister requested guidance from the State Council, the nation's chief constitutional advisory body, regarding requirements concerning the application procedure. The State Council delivered a favorable opinion in August, declaring that an application for NATO membership need not be submitted to public referendum as the PSOE had demanded, but could be approved by parliamentary action. The government immediately applied to the Cortes for permission to file such an application. Both the Chamber of Deputies (on October 29) and the Spanish Senate (on November 26) passed measures favoring the request in late autumn, with the UCD being supported by members of the Popular Alliance and Basque and Catalan regional parties. On December 3 the government submitted its

application to the North Atlantic Council which, at its 10 December session, voted in favor of extending Spain an invitation for membership.

Following the Council's action, each member nation must take action to ratify the invitation. Ratification by all members will be required to make the invitation effective. The instruments of ratification will be deposited with the United States Archives, the Custodian of the Treaty. The United States Government will notify all members that the invitation has been ratified when the last of the ratification instruments has been received in Washington, and then formally extend the invitation to Spain. When the Spanish Government communicates to Washington its acceptance of the invitation, the accession process will be complete. It is widely hoped that this will occur prior to the May 1982 meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial level, thus allowing Spain's Foreign Minister to participate in the meeting and be welcomed into the Alliance.

The Spanish Government has made a major political investment in the NATO issue. Its victory over domestic opposition from the Socialists, the Communists, and certain elements within the Army was not easily won. Calvo-Sotelo has shown much greater concern for the interests of the conservative right than his predecessor, both to reduce agitation for military action by the right, and to win Army support for NATO membership. His government is dependent upon an alliance with the conservative Popular Alliance to maintain its parliamentary majority, but as a result of his attention to the conservatives, the UCD has been losing support among its liberal elements. Fifteen members of the liberal social democratic element walked out of the government in November to found their own Democratic Action Party.

Suarez, himself a member of the social democratic wing of the UCD, has quietly questioned the wisdom of dividing the nation on the NATO issue at this time, and agrees that Calvo-Sotelo has been too attentive to the conservatives since taking office. There are some observers who forsee the realignment of Spain's political parties largely as a result of the NATO debate, with a new coalition of liberal and socialist elements dominating a left-of-center movement. [Ref. 6]

The UCD has not fared well in recent regional elections, and is not expected to do well in the elections scheduled for this spring in Andalusia. National elections are not scheduled until 1983, but rumors have surfaced that Calvo-Sotelo will call for general elections in the fall of 1982. Clearly, he is counting on prestige generated by successful ratification of NATO accession to bolster his party's domestic popularity. Thus far it appears that his gamble may pay off.

E. SELECTION OF ISSUES FOR STUDY

The preceding section provided a brief background discussion of the domestic political issues in Spain surrounding the accession process. The remainder of the thesis will focus on international political issues surrounding the process. The thesis seeks to outline and explain the position of each of four concerned foreign governments, relating each state's position to national interests and historical development; it attempts to show how the interests of the various states have interacted during the accession process and, in addition, offers conclusions regarding the further effects which each issue may have on the eventual integration of Spain into NATO and on long term Alliance cohesion. The four governments chosen for study--the U.S.S.R., Britain, Portugal, and

the Federal Republic of Germany--were selected because their views, and the issues they raise, relate directly to the Alliance's ability to fulfill its primary responsibility as the guarantor of Western European security.

The second chapter of the thesis therefore deals with the attempts of the Soviet Union to influence the accession process. The chapter opens with a discussion of Soviet interests with regard to Spanish membership in NATO, and continues with an analysis of the strategy adopted by the Soviets to pursue their objectives. Conclusions are drawn regarding the effectiveness of the Soviet strategy and implications for longer term Soviet influence in Alliance relations.

Chapter III discusses the historical dispute between Spain and Great Britain over Gibraltar, emphasizing the interaction since 1975 between this issue and the accession process. A major point raised in this chapter centers on the attempt by both Spain and Britain to use the North Atlantic Alliance as a framework on which to build a compromise solution to the Gibraltar question. The implications for NATO of such a plan are analyzed, particularly with regard to the probability that a solution satisfactory to all parties can be reached in the near future. The chapter also discusses the effect of the Gibraltar issue on the realignment of NATO's military command structure, providing background in this instance for the following chapter.

The relationship which will most dramatically influence the restructuring of the NATO military organization will be the relationship between Spain and Portugal. Chapter IV examines this relationship in some detail, explaining its historical evolution and why it will be so important in determining new command relationships. The closing

section of the chapter offers one possible outline for a new NATO command structure.

The final issue to be examined involves the effect which Spanish accession might have on NATO strategy for the defense of the Central European Front, the predominant concern of the Federal Republic of Germany. With the Spanish Government eager to find a meaningful NATO role for its Army, and at the same time, NATO leadership concerned about its ability to execute Alliance defense strategy successfully, it would seem that a mutually advantageous solution might be possible. Chapter V examines this possibility.

Many other issues warrant further investigation, but not all are explored in this thesis. For example, the phenomenon of European Socialist solidarity might be examined in order to understand why Greek and Dutch Socialist parties feel strongly that they should support PSOE objections to NATO membership while the Socialist parties of France and the Federal Republic of Germany strongly favor accession. Another topic of interest would be the status of the Spanish enclaves in North Africa under the North Atlantic Treaty. A special protocol will be required to include the enclaves under the defensive umbrella of NATO, and the Spanish hope fervently to convince the Alliance that such a protocol is justified. And, of course, a major question not touched on by this thesis is the interest of the United States in Spain, particularly with regard to changes in the bilateral relationships between the two nations following Spanish accession.

II. SOVIET INFLUENCE AND THE ACCESSION PROCESS

A. OVERVIEW

The Soviet Union is the one state outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whose national interests have been most directly affected by Spain's move toward NATO. Psychologically, Spain's desire for association with the Western Alliance could boost sagging morale and self-confidence within NATO at a time when Alliance cohesion is being sorely tested by various challenges, particularly including issues of Intermediate Nuclear Weapons Modernization.

Ideologically, the Soviets fear that Spain's peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy could provide an alternative model to the politics of terrorism and violence which they promote in the Third World. A complete and successful transition could have a particularly strong effect in Latin America where Spanish influence is most significant. [Ref. 7]

Strategically, the Soviets have claimed that the integration of Spain into NATO would "influence the correlation of forces which has been created in Europe and lead in the end to the aggravation of international tension and the spurring of the arms race". [Ref. 8] Western leaders have disputed such claims pointing out that accession will only formalize the bilateral relationship between Spain and the United States which has existed since 1953. Yet there can be no doubt that Spain's membership in the Alliance will serve to bind it more tightly to its Atlantic neighbors and force the Soviet Union to reevaluate the strategic East-West relationship.

Soviet attempts to influence Western European decisionmaking are neither new nor unusual. An example which parallels the question of Spanish accession is provided by the Soviet response to NATO's last expansion--the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. Adam Ulam discusses the breadth and variety of tactics employed by the Soviets to prevent this development:

> . . . a veritable barrage of Soviet diplomatic notes continued to attempt first to prevent West Germany's accession to NATO, and then to undo it. At one time, and rather humorously, the Soviets proposed their own joining of the Western defense organization. At other times, as in the note of October 23 with German entrance into NATO imminent, the Soviet Government held out the alluring prospect of discussing the Western proposals for all-German elections, as well as the Austrian peace treaty and atomic disarmament. [Ref. 9]

Finally, when all diplomatic efforts to foil German accession appeared doomed, the Soviets convened their own conference on European security in November 1954. From this conference emerged the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and bilateral agreements for the permanent maintenance of Soviet troops on Hungarian and Romanian soil. These developments have been viewed as a direct reaction to the expansion of NATO through the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. [Ref. 10]

Given the high level of Soviet interest in the direction of political development in Spain, and the past history of Soviet involvement in the affairs of the Western European community, Soviet initiatives aimed at influencing the Spanish accession process have materialized largely as should have been expected. The initiatives have been directed toward three targets and have met with varying degrees of success. The least successful Soviet initiatives have attempted to influence the Spanish Government directly. Initiatives aimed at

persuading the nations of Western Europe that Spanish accession would not be in the best interests of the community have been equally unsuccessful. Only in the third area, the indirect exercise of influence through the Spanish domestic political process, have developments proceeded in a way which paralleled Soviet objectives.

This chapter will review the Soviet initiatives in each of the three areas, assess the effectiveness of these initiatives in achieving their objectives, and discuss the implications of the initiatives for the future exercise of Soviet influence in Spanish and Alliance politics.

B. DIPLOMATIC COURTSHIP OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

Amid a great deal of flattering international rhetoric, formal diplomatic relations between Spain and the Soviet Union were reestablished on February 9, 1977, for the first time since the days of the "Blue Division" in World War II. Much of the Soviet rhetoric dwelt on the "reasonable" policies of the government of Prime Minister Adolpho Suarez, which the Soviets praised as contributing to "fruitful cooperation among states with different systems" [Ref. 11], and on the sympathy of the Soviet people for the "heroic struggle of the Spanish people against the dictatorship". [Ref. 12]. The Soviet Union wasted no time in expanding trade agreements involving the delivery of Soviet machinery and the purchase of Spanish steel, wine, footwear, and vegetable oil. According to Newsweek magazine, as early as 1977 the Soviets offered to sweeten the pot further by signing favorable contracts with Spanish shipyards on the condition that Spain stay out of NATO. [Ref. 13]

At the invitation of the Soviet Government, Spanish Foreign Minister Oreja Aguirre visited Moscow in January 1979. During his visit he held extensive meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and was received by both Prime Minister Kosygin and President Brezhnev. In November 1979 Mr. Gromyko visited Spain, at which time he and Oreja concluded several agreements on cultural, scientific, technological and communications cooperation. [Ref. 14] The TASS communique which followed the meetings stressed that one of the important achievements of the new Spanish Government "was the restoration of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. . . . In particular, the country (Spain) remains at present outside of NATO". [Ref. 15] A constant theme in Soviet diplomatic and press coverage of the emerging Spanish democracy was the positive value of nonalignment, and the need to develop stronger cultural and economic ties between Spain and the Socialist states of Eastern Europe.

Trade between the Soviet Union and Spain expanded dramatically during the 1970's. By Soviet calculations, the commodity turnover between the two states amounted to 403 million rubles in 1980, compared to only 13.4 million rubles in 1970. Recent growth in Spanish importation of tractors, energy and energy related equipment, machinery, and mining equipment has been significant. The Soviet Union has concluded an agreement for uranium enrichment to fuel Spanish nuclear reactors. Negotiations are in progress for production-sharing and joint-stock agreements between the two states. [Ref. 16]

But trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe still amounts to a small fraction of Spain's overall import/export totals. To

place them in perspective, exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe actually peaked in 1975, the year of Franco's death, when they accounted for 3.3 percent of total volume. The same is true of imports from Comecon nations, which amounted to 2.9 percent of the total in 1975. In 1979, the latest year for which statistics are available, the export share was 3.0 percent, while the import share was 2.2 percent. Trade with the Soviet Union alone, omitting the other Eastern European states, accounted for less than half of the above totals.

In contrast, trade with the United States accounted for 7.0 percent of Spanish exports and 12.4 percent of imports in 1979. Trade with European Economic Community nations accounted for a whopping 48 percent of exports and 32 percent of imports. Leading purchasers of Spanish exports were France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States--in that order. The U.S.S.R. ranked 16th, behind such states as Algeria, Morocco, Venezuela, Switzerland, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Argentina. [Ref 17]

Thus, despite Soviet rhetoric, Spain's economic links with Eastern Europe remain limited. They account for a very small portion of Spanish trade, with most of the growth since 1975 a result of price inflation rather than real growth in the volume of goods transferred. Soviet initiatives to expand the trade relationship have been unsuccessful.

In several other ways, relations between Spain and the Soviet Union have not been as smooth as they might have been during the period of courtship. There have been reports of frequent and widespread KGB activity in Spain. Early instances of espionage were related to the American presence at Rota and Torrejon, but since the United States

withdrew its nuclear forces from Spanish bases in 1979, most of the espionage charges have been related to domestic Spanish affairs. The first two alleged Soviet spies were expelled from the country in 1978. [Ref. 18] Since that time, several more Soviet diplomats or government employees have been expelled for spying. [Ref. 19]

Of even greater concern to the Spanish were indications of linkage between the Soviet Union and various regional separatist movements within Spain, particularly the terrorist Basque ETA organization. Beginning in 1978, such links were widely reported in both the Spanish and foreign press. According to the Madrid evening newspaper Informaciones, "it has been proved that there is a firm connection between the terrorist organization ETA and the Soviet secret service, the KGB". [Ref. 20] The same paper went on to say that a prominent Spanish business leader visiting Moscow had received the following offer: "If you allow us to use Spain as a springboard to penetrate South America, as well as decide not to enter NATO, we will leave you in peace in the Basque country". [Ref. 21]

One American periodical, the New Leader, has gone so far as to report a similar offer made on a much higher level:

> Most telling of all, though, was the offer Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin made early this year to Spain's Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. The Kremlin, Kosygin said, would help 'turn off' the terrorists if Spain would pledge not to join NATO. [Ref. 22]

Other reports have linked the Soviet Canaries fishing fleet with arms smuggling to the ETA, to the Urban GRAPO organization, and to the Movement for Autonomy and Independence of the Canary Islands. [Ref. 23] Several well-documented Western sources have confirmed that at least

an indirect Soviet-terrorist link exists, with the Soviets supporting terrorist training and providing arms and supplies. The Soviets, of course, have denied all such allegations.

A turning point in Spanish-Soviet relations was reached following Gromyko's visit to Madrid in 1979. During meetings with Oreja and Suarez, Gromyko had attempted to persuade the Spanish leaders that NATO membership would not be in Spain's best interests. He was firmly rebuffed. Declaring that Spain was "independent" but not "neutral", Oreja made it perfectly clear that his country felt itself to be an integral member of the Western community. Gromyko was further embarrassed when questions regarding abuse of the Canary Islands fishing base and Soviet support for separatist terrorism were publicly raised by Suarez. [Ref. 24 & 25] The Soviets were politely but firmly told that Spain would choose its own course, and that advice, however "well-meaning", would not be received kindly. This visit marks the end of the courtship period in Spanish-Soviet relations. From this time forward, Soviet initiatives in Spain were directed toward indirect influence through the political process rather than direct diplomatic influence of the Madrid government.

The Spanish Government chose to interpret the respite in Soviet diplomatic initiatives as a sign of Soviet acceptance of Spain's decision to join the Atlantic Alliance. In an interview with the Madrid daily ABC, the current Foreign Minister, Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, stated that he has observed:

> . . . in the Soviet Union and throughout the East European socialist camp a calculation in which they have reached the conclusion that they cannot prevent Spain from joining the Atlantic alliance. [Ref. 26]

There is probably at least some truth to this interpretation, for it is clear that the Soviets were not particularly optimistic about their ability to influence the UCD government following the embarrassing failure of the Gromyko mission. But in a larger sense, the respite merely signaled a shift in Soviet tactics rather than an admission of failure. After 1980, most of the Soviet initiatives were directed at weakening popular support for the UCD and promoting the interests of the PSOE and PCE, both of whom publicly opposed NATO membership for Spain.

Only one other major appeal by the Soviet Union, directly to the Spanish Government, has been reported since 1979. On September 7, 1981, Soviet Charge d'Affaires Ivanov delivered a memorandum to the Spanish Foreign Ministry warning Spain of the negative consequences of its decision to apply for NATO membership. The note was immediately returned to the Soviet Charge after it had been reviewed by the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. The Spanish Government accused the Soviet Union of flagrant interference in the country's internal affairs. A formal note of protest was later delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, in which Spain denied that its accession into NATO represented any danger to the Soviet Union and was thus a matter of no concern to the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 27]

In response to these charges, the Soviets claimed that the enlargement of the militarist Western Alliance imposed a legitimate obligation upon the U.S.S.R. to express its position. They claimed that those who interpreted the memorandum as interference in Spanish internal affairs were those who were:

> . . . interested in casting shadows over the Spanish-Soviet relationship. Those pro-Atlantic circles that emphasize the anti-Soviet campaign are not, after all, interested in the consolidation of peace and security in Europe and in reducing the level of tension and military confrontation on our continent. They are playing the game of the militarist policy of the present Washington administration. [Ref. 28]

The truth probably lies somewhere in between the two sets of allegations, for the parliamentary debate over the accession was approaching its peak in Spain at the time. Both the Spanish Government and the U.S.S.R. sought to gain as much political mileage from the incident as possible. Support for the UCD's pro-NATO position would be improved if a sinister motive were ascribed to the Soviet note. On the other hand, the Soviets surely knew in advance what the reaction of the Calvo-Sotelo government would be, and countercharges of "militarist sabotage of détente" were delivered so quickly after the rejection of the note as to lead one to believe that they might have been prepared in advance.

C. SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE MEMBERS

Under Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty, the application of any new member must be unanimously approved by all members. Thus Spain's membership could be blocked if Soviet initiatives deterred any member from ratifying the Spanish membership application. Although, according to Uwe Nerlich, Soviet leverage has yet to influence any decision regarding the fabric of the Western Alliance,

> Soviet diplomacy, which first tried to prevent formative developments within the Atlantic Alliance, was anxious then to encourage bilateral détente efforts of individual Western countries in order to tear apart the alliance structures. [Ref. 29]

The concept of détente was the Soviet's basic weapon in the campaign to influence Alliance members regarding Spanish accession. As early as

1978, shortly after Spain's move toward the Western European community became clear, the Soviets began a propaganda campaign designed to discourage support for Spanish membership within the Alliance. Directing the propaganda primarily at the Northern Europeans, to whom détente was most important, the Soviets proclaimed that Spain's accession would:

> . . . inevitably lead to a rise in the level of confrontation between the two European politico-military groupings. This would act as a stimulus to those who are bent on continuing the policy of blocs. It would hinder still more the efforts by the European states to structure their relations on a European basis. [Ref. 30]

In an apparent effort to give substance to the claim that tensions would inevitably rise, rumors intermittently surfaced that the Soviet Union might respond to Spanish accession by incorporating Yugoslavia, Cuba, or Vietnam into the Warsaw Pact. These rumors surfaced most frequently through the Communist Party offices of other nations, which was probably a good indication that they lacked substance. They seemed even less plausible in view of the geo-strategic positions and political situations of the three countries mentioned. Yet they smack of the tactics used by Moscow in 1955 when the Warsaw Pact itself was not a terribly plausible threat. [Refs. 31, 32, 33, & 34]

The Soviets applied both the carrot and the stick to the Western Europeans. Even as they were obliquely threatening to expand their own alliance they were also continuing to push the resolution previously presented at the Helsinki Conference in 1975 to prohibit expansion of both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This measure, formally endorsed by the Warsaw Pact Political Advisory Committee [Ref. 35], was again pressed by the Soviets at the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. [Ref. 36]

In but one case, that of the Federal Republic of Germany, did the Soviets single out a particular nation for attention in this campaign. The Soviets regarded the Germans as co-conspirators, along with the United States, in pushing NATO membership upon the Spanish. They went so far as to suggest that German support for Spanish membership was based upon the interests of a small group of Bundeswehr generals and military industrialists who saw Spanish membership in NATO as furthering their private interests in Spain. [Ref. 37] The Soviets used such allegations in an attempt to weaken German domestic support for Spanish accession. They also applied pressure directly on the Social Democratic government of the Federal Republic. The Times reported that, during his visit to Moscow in 1980, Chancellor Schmidt was warned by Soviet President Brezhnev to drop his support for Spanish accession. [Ref. 38]

Although ratification of the Spanish membership application is still not complete, it does not appear that the Soviet initiatives have been at all successful. Secretary General Luns announced as early as May 1981, only weeks after Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo had declared his government's decision to accelerate Spain's move toward NATO membership, that all member nations of the alliance had promised their support for accession. [Ref. 39] The ratification process is apparently proceeding without serious opposition.

Greek opposition, briefly voiced at the December 1981 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, was publicly justified on the basis of solidarity with Spanish Socialists rather than agreement with Soviet arguments. The Greek position was probably no more than an exercise in muscle flexing by President Papandreou, who was in the process of renegotiating

his country's position in NATO at the time the Spanish application was being discussed. When the actual vote was taken on December 10, Greece quietly voted with the other Alliance members in favor of extending an invitation to Spain.

In Germany, the voice of former Chancellor Brandt has been nearly alone in crying the dangers to détente of Spanish accession. The position of the Brandt element of the SPD is consistent with their traditional position of supporting détente at nearly any cost. The government of the Federal Republic remains firmly committed to supporting Spanish accession.

Canada and the United Kingdom have already completed ratification of the accession protocol, while the other Alliance members hope to complete the ratification process prior to the May meeting of the Defense Planning Committee. The only delay which can be envisioned at this point would be related to procedural requirements in one or possibly two of the Central European states.

D. SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS IN SPAIN

The Soviet Union began an anti-NATO propaganda campaign in Spain as early as 1978. The arguments used at the height of the propaganda campaign in September 1981 were essentially refinements of the arguments originally presented in 1978, although the emphasis had shifted from persuasion to coercion. Virtually all Soviet presentations on the subject of accession repeated the same basic themes.

Initially, the strongest thrust of Soviet propaganda was an appeal to Spanish pride. In this context, the Soviets accused the UCD government of succumbing to pressure from the United States rather than first considering the interests of the Spanish people. It was claimed

that the U.S. was anxious to expand its forces in Spain under the NATO mandate, making Spain in particular a forward base for the Rapid Deployment Force. It also was claimed that once Spain was in NATO, the U.S. would pressure the government to accept the return of nuclear weapons to Spanish soil.

The Soviets argued that Spain should play a role "worthy" of its world position, and this meant that it must pursue an independent foreign policy rather than subscribe to the dictates of the United States and the Atlantic bloc. Spanish citizens were told that their prestige and influence would suffer globally should the nation associate itself with the Atlantic Alliance:

> Practice shows that the countries which do not accept blocs and apply an independent foreign policy exercise much greater influence on the course of international affairs than the countries which are dragged into military blocs. [Ref. 40]

The Soviets argued that membership in the Alliance would reduce Spanish prestige in Latin America, an area which was concerned by American attempts to exercise regional hegemony. Spanish prestige also would be reduced in North Africa, particularly if the Canary Islands (which lie off the coast of Morocco) were opened up to NATO military facilities. The Soviets pointed out that Edem Kodjo, Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, had expressed OAU concern for the destabilizing effects of a NATO military base in the Canaries. [Ref. 41]

On the other hand, the positive benefits of a nonaligned policy or closer association with the world's Socialist nations were heralded. The arguments on this theme paralleled those already discussed in the section on direct diplomatic relations. To the UCD assertion that NATO accession was merely one more step toward the assumption by Spain of an

influential place in the Western community, the Soviets retorted that NATO membership was not a precondition for membership in the Western community. Attempting to weaken the linkage between NATO and the Western community of nations, the Soviets pointed out that Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland were all "undoubtedly" members of the Western community but not NATO members. Further, it was pointed out, these nations were free of the "straight-jacket of bloc discipline" which restricted their freedom to develop relations with neighbors in Eastern Europe. [Ref. 42] A synthesis of these arguments could lead only to the conclusion, the Soviets asserted, that Spain's international prestige and national interests would best be served by pursuing an independent policy not associated with either bloc.

Soviet propaganda also questioned the economic burden of NATO membership for the Spanish people. Only the highest cost estimates were cited, and Spanish references were normally given for the figures used. The most frequently quoted source was the daily El Pais, which has opposed Spain's association with NATO. The cost estimates were inflated by attributing all current Spanish defense budget increases to the cost of NATO membership, and by hypothesizing that all benefits from the U.S.-Spanish base rights agreements would be lost should Spain join NATO. The Soviet broadcasts did not bother to explain that the government was committed to modernizing the nation's Armed Forces regardless of whether Spain joined the Alliance; nor did they bother to explain that most of the "benefits" of the base rights agreement were in the form of loan guarantees rather than grants. At a time when the Spanish economy was troubled by rising energy costs and falling revenue from tourism, the economic cost arguments created serious concern among the Spanish people.

Just prior to the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid (and shortly after Gromyko's ill-fated visit to Madrid), Soviet rhetoric turned from rational, if biased, reasoning to open threat. In a January 26, 1980 broadcast, Radio Moscow asserted to the Spanish People that Spain's entry into NATO was viewed as "the principal obstacle on the road to détente . . . the realization of which so vitally concerns the people of Europe". Furthermore, the broadcast continued, Washington had forced on Brussels a program to install new nuclear missiles in Europe, the effect of which "could turn West Europe into the hostage and future victim" of a nuclear conflict. [Ref. 43]

President Brezhnev's pledge that the Soviet Union would not use nuclear weapons against any state which did not own or accept nuclear weapons on its soil was repeated frequently. Simultaneously, the Soviets questioned whether the UCD government, if it bowed to U.S. pressure for NATO accession, could be expected to resist inevitable U.S. pressure to once again accept the deployment of nuclear weapons in Spain. The Soviets attempted to convince the Spanish that rather than enhancing Spain's security, membership in the Atlantic Alliance actually would weaken it.

Finally, the Soviets argued that NATO membership would weaken rather than strengthen democracy in Spain. They declared that NATO had an anti-democratic tradition, citing the admission of Portugal under Salazar, and later the acceptance of the "Colonel's Regime" in Greece and the Caetano government in Portugal as evidence to support the thesis. The real reason why the U.S. and its allies wanted Spain in NATO, they argued, was that they were concerned with the increasing activity of

the democratic forces in Spain--forces which the Soviet Union saw as supporting neutrality. Washington's goal, it was alleged, was to expand its influence over Spanish politics and prevent the democratization process from going "too far". [Ref. 44]

Within Spain, reaction to Soviet propaganda varied in each of the major political parties. The strongest reaction has come from the Union del Centro Democratica, the government majority party. The UCD has tried with some success to turn the Soviet propaganda back against the U.S.S.R., attempting to create a popular backlash against Soviet interference. The incidents of alleged KGB activity and the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from Spain have received wide coverage in the. government-controlled broadcast media, as did the diplomatic note from Moscow in September 1981. Members of the opposition party have accused the Calvo-Sotelo government of "creating" an incident with the Soviet Union in order to forward their own position as advocates of NATO. Said Fernando Moran, the PSOE's ranking representative on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> As for the handing over of the note, I must say that the problem posed by the incident lies in the publicizing of it. I believe that if Yugoslavia decided to join the Warsaw Pact, the United States would inform Belgrade of the consequences which, in its ipinion, that would have. Who publicized the note? The government with its protest? The TASS news agency? This is a priority issue to be debated. [Ref. 45]

A clash of major proportions erupted in August 1981 between the PSOE and elements of the UCD concerning Soviet influence on the NATO decision. Unidentified sources within the UCD leaked to the Spanish press allegations of a "deal" between the PSOE and the Soviet Union on the NATO question. According to the allegations, the PSOE had agreed to oppose

Spain's membership in NATO in return for Soviet aid in securing power in the Spanish Government. The allegations were widely publicized in the Spanish press.

The leadership of the PSOE vehemently denied the existence of any such agreement and demanded a retraction from the government. Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo, in a public press conference, admitted that his party had acted thoughtlessly in releasing the allegations. He declared that publication of the allegations represented an indiscretion, and stated he did not believe that "a secret agreement with the CPSU can seriously be attributed to the PSOE". [Ref. 46]

The political clash had come at an unfortunate time for the Prime Minister, for it threatened to wreck recently-reached agreements between the UCD and PSOE concerning trade union management and a formula for regional autonomy. The agreements were very important to the stability of the new government, and their collapse could have precipitated a crisis within the UCD. [Ref. 47] Yet the likelihood remains that the allegations were leaked, perhaps with the Prime Minister's approval or perhaps not, as a concious attempt to discredit PSOE opposition to NATO. That the other political liabilities spawned by the disclosure were not recognized is perhaps a result of certain party members' inexperience with the process of democracy.

For its part, the PSOE has been ambivalent about Soviet influence. While it publicly rejects Soviet interference in Spanish politics, PSOE spokesmen acknowledge that Soviet interests will be affected by the accession question, as will those of the United States. They claim that both nations are equally guilty of pressuring Spain regarding the

debate. Regarding the diplomatic note of September 1981, a PSOE spokesman said:

> As a party, we reject any interference by the U.S.S.R. in internal affairs. As for the contents of the U.S.S.R.'s document, three aspects of it must be highlighted: First, it states that entry into NATO is an issue to be decided on by the Spanish people, which is positive and an advance in Soviet stances; second, it emphasizes the harmful effect of this entry on détente; and there is a third part, with veiled threats against Spain, which is totally unacceptable. [Ref. 48]

To support the thesis that U.S. pressure in favor of accession is just as great as Soviet pressure against the issue, the PSOE produced documents allegedly showing that the journal in which the CPSU-PSOE agreement story had been first published, the Carta del Este, was financed by the American CIA. [Ref. 49]

The PSOE position has been based on a policy of opposition to association with either bloc. The PSOE has been sympathetic to Soviet suggestions that association with NATO will restrict Spain's free conduct of foreign relations and subject it to external pressure from the stronger members of the alliance, particularly the United States. But the position appears to have been arrived at independently rather than as a result of Soviet influence. The PSOE favored a public referendum on the NATO question rather than a parliamentary vote, but it agreed publicly that it would abide by the results of such a referendum whether favorable or not.[1] As the outcome of the parliamentary debates concerning accession became less doubtful, the PSOE softened its stance on

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[1]There is not much doubt that such a referendum would have resulted in defeat of the NATO proposal. A poll published in July by the Madrid newspaper Diario 16 showed that only 36 percent of Spaniards favored accession while 43 percent were opposed. Other polls had shown even less support for accession.

the long term question of NATO membership. Previously the party had declared that, should it win power in a subsequent election, it would vote Spain back out of NATO through parliamentary action just as the UCD had voted it in. Now the party merely says that it will reopen debate on the issue. [Ref. 50] Further, PSOE support for renewal of the U.S. base rights treaty indicates that the party does in fact view the Soviet Union as the greater security threat to Spain.

The position of the PCE has been quite close to that of the PSOE. Says Sr. Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Spanish Communist Party:

> Some people have tried to identify our position with that of . . . the Soviet Union. However, I should like to say that our position has nothing to do with the position of the Soviet Union. We said at our congress that the class struggle in the international area is not waged through the confrontation between the two blocs existing in the world today but rather through their abolition. [Ref. 51]

Like the PSOE, the PCE has agreed with government rejection of Soviet interference in Spain's internal affairs. But, adds Santiago Carrillo:

> . . . why does Calvo-Sotelo's government not show the same self-respect in connection with the continuous U.S. interference in Spanish politics? Why does Calvo-Sotelo humble himself? [Ref. 52]

Given Santiago Carrillo's unique and independent brand of Euro-Communism, which dates from prior to the 1976 Berlin Communist Party Conference, it is unlikely that he is being less than truthful with such shetoric. The PCE, like the PSOE, agrees with some of the points made in Soviet anti-NATO propaganda. But each of the parties has reached its viewpoint independently, and neither has been influenced strongly by the Soviet Union.[2]

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[2]In addition to those articles cited in Ref. 51 and 52, a comprehensive year by year sampling of Soviet propaganda can be found in: Anatoly

E. CONCLUSIONS

Soviet efforts to influence events leading up to Spanish accession into NATO have not been effective. The European community has been indifferent to Soviet protestations concerning changes in the balance of power in Europe and the end of détente. The Soviet cause certainly has not been strengthened in this regard by a general deterioration of détente surrounding the events in Afghanistan and Poland which have proceeded concurrently with the Spanish accession process. In dealing with the government of Spain, since 1978 the Soviet Union actually has created additional animosity between the two states, and its sometimes brash attempts to influence Spanish policy have provided the UCD with additional arguments to support acceleration of the accession process. Although certain of the propaganda arguments presented in Soviet press and broadcasts have been repeated by Spain's opposition parties, there is no reason to believe that Soviet propaganda has been instrumental in shaping the positions of the PSOE or the PCE on the NATO issue.

However, on at least one issue the Soviets can claim victory. How much their propaganda had to do with the victory is uncertain, for the attentive Spanish public became concerned about the question of American nuclear weapons in Europe at about the same time as other Europeans.

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2 Cont. Medvedenko, "Drawing Spain Into NATO," New Times, Moscow, No. 26:78, June 1978, pp. 22-3; Radio Moscow Broadcast in Spanish, Mikhail Kremnev, Commentator, 2 April 1979 (from FBIS: U.S.S.R. Edition, 4 April 1979, pp. G7-8; Radio Moscow Broadcast in Spanish, Aleksey Georgiyev, Commentator, 26 January 1980 (from FBIS: U.S.S.R. Edition, 28 January 1980, pp. G3-4); "CPSU Publishes Greetings to PCE Congress," Pravda, 28 July 1981, p. 1 (from FBIS: U.S.S.R. Edition, 3 August 1981, P. G1); Radio Moscow Broadcast in Spanish, August 24, 1981 (from (FBIS: U.S.S.R. Edition, 26 August 1981, pp. G1-2).

Soviet threats and propaganda probably had as much to do with popularizing the issue in Spain as well as elsewhere in Europe. Precisely how much influence that was is uncertain. But whatever the degree of influence, concern for the issue in Spain has led to government agreement to keep Spain a nuclear-free zone whether or not the country enters NATO.

The writing was on the wall in 1975-76, during negotiations for the renewal of U.S. base access in Spain. The Spanish demanded at the time, and the U.S. conceded, that all nuclear weapons be removed from the naval and air bases. The government now has officially stated that under no circumstances will nuclear weapons be deployed to or stored in Spain in the future. [Ref. 53] The significance of this victory is limited, since U.S. ballistic missile submarines and strategic air forces already have been removed under the provisions of the 1976 bilateral treaty. Still, Spanish rejection of the weapons reinforces the current trend within NATO toward the renunciation of a theater nuclear deterrent.

There is still one way in which Soviet influence could affect the final outcome of the accession process. Soviet support for Spain's various regional separatist movements could escalate the conflict between the government and the terrorists. The debate concerning regional autonomy was one of the issues which precipitated the fall of the Spanish Republic in 1939. The formulation of a policy for dealing with the autonomy question is one of the major problems facing the UCD government today.

A crisis was narrowly averted during the past summer when allegations of the CPSU-PSOE "deal" nearly wrecked autonomy formula agreements with the minority party. The discontent of the conservative right over

"soft treatment" of separatist terrorists by the government was an immediate cause of the February 1981 coup attempt in Madrid.

The UCD government has embarked on its accelerated quest for NATO membership as a way to get the Army out of domestic politics. But should terrorist activity, possibly with Soviet backing, accelerate in spite of the government's autonomy concessions, it is possible that either the conservative right or the Social Democratic element of the UCD could withdraw its support for NATO membership before accession is ratified by all Alliance members. An even worse possibility is that escalated terrorism could lead to another coup attempt by the right before accession is complete. A return to dictatorial government would surely result in the veto of Spanish accession by liberal Northern European states; even if unsuccessful, another coup attempt might result in one or more of those states demanding that the Spanish Government demonstrate greater stability before the protocol of accession is ratified. Fortunately, at the time of this writing, chances of such an eventuality are slim, but the possibility still exists that the accession process may fail.

III. ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS: THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION

A. OVERVIEW

Article Ten of the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, begins as follows:

> The Catholic King (of Spain) does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any exception and impediment whatsoever. [Ref. 54]

Thus did Spain acknowledge England's conquest and occupation of Gibraltar during the War of the Spanish Succession; and thus, apparently, was the right of sovereignty over that strategic bit of real estate passed forever to Great Britain. Yet since 1954 the issue of sovereignty over Gibraltar has reemerged with renewed vigor, threatening in recent years to stall Spain's entry into NATO and the European Economic Community.

It is surprising that this apparently anachronistic dispute should have resurfaced inasmuch as Britain was one of the first nations to join the United States in expanding relations with Spain following World War II, and has nominally been one of Spain's most consistent supporters in that nation's efforts to enter the mainstream of the community of Western European nations. It is doubly surprising that Spain continues to press its claim to sovereignty in spite of the fact that Britain is in a position to block her entry into NATO, a setback which the moderate Spanish UCD government could hardly tolerate in its politically vulnerable position.

The Gibraltar issue is, in fact, far from an anachronism, a lively issue in which Spain, Britain, and the residents of Gibraltar all have


GIBRALTAR AND ENVIRONS
Cadiz (50 km)
SPAIN
San Roque
La Linea
Airfield
Algeciras
GIBRALTAR
Tarifa
STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR
Scale (km)
0
10
20
Ceuta
MOROCCO

Figure 1

significant interests, and one which is far from final resolution. In spite of both nation's commitment to resolving the issue concurrently with the accession of Spain into NATO, it is likely that a permanent solution which satisfies all parties will not be forthcoming in the near future, and that the issue will remain as a source of friction within the Alliance in the future.

B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM

1. The Spanish Position

The Spanish claim they have continuously challenged Britain's claim of sovereignty since the capture of Gibraltar by Admiral Sir George Rooke in 1704. In the selection of the word "continuously", the Spanish exaggerate somewhat, for the third and last military challenge to British possession came in 1783. Following that year's failure of the so-called "Great Siege" to dislodge the English from the fortress, the issue was not seriously raised again until 1954 when it was renewed by the Franco government. Only briefly, in the late 1800's, was the issue officially broached during this 170 year interlude. Spain was too busy trying to resolve the pressing problems of domestic instability and its own crumbling empire to challenge the power of Great Britain.

During the Napoleonic Wars and World War II, Gibraltar was threatened by third powers, but in each case Spain proved unwilling or unable to aid the enemy in dislodging Britain from the fortress. In the Second World War, Franco not only refused Hitler permission to send troops through Spain to attack Gibraltar, but allowed Britain to proceed unchallenged with the construction of an airfield on the low ground

between Gibraltar and Spain, land which had previously been a neutral "no-man's-land" between the Spanish and English fortifications.

A changing relationship between Spain and Britain allowed Franco to renew the Spanish claim to Gibraltar in 1954. Stabilization of the Spanish Government, and recovery from the trauma of the Civil War had proceeded, although slowly, over a 15-year period. In 1954, Spain's central government was secure and its economy was showing signs of positive growth for the first time in years. Spain's position of isolation in the world community was softening, as evidenced by a Treaty of Friendship concluded with the United States in 1953, and her admission to the United Nations in 1954. More importantly, the position of Great Britain was seriously eroded by economic and social problems precipitated by the war, and by global pressure for an end to colonialism. The global anti-colonial movement, which had its forum in the United Nations, offered Franco a favorable environment to renew Spain's claim to Gibraltar.

Franco's motives for renewing his claim at this time were probably four-fold. Economically, Gibraltar was both boon and bane to Spain. In the early 1950's, as many as 13,000 Spaniards daily crossed the line to work in the shipyards, shops, and homes of Gibraltar. The income from these jobs provided a basis for the economies of the nearby Spanish towns of La Linea and San Roque, and formed a significant part of Spain's then-small hard currency income. But, Gibraltar was infested also with smugglers, many of whom became rich circumventing the high Spanish import duties by running tobacco and consumer goods in small motor launches up the Spanisn coast from Gibraltar. In 1961, for example, British figures show that Gibraltar imported 841 million American cigarettes in

one six-month period. That amounts to about 40,000 cigarettes, or 2,000 packs of cigarettes, for each man, woman, and child in the colony. Obviously, most of those cigarettes were not consumed by Gibraltarians. The high volume of smuggling from Gibraltar dearly cost the Spanish Government lost tariff revenues, and Spain claimed that dumping of Spanish currency by smugglers on the monetary exchanges of Zurich was having a destabilizing effect on the value of the paseta. [Ref. 55]

Politically, since WWII Franco had been concerned with the rise of liberal, democratic ideas among the Gibraltarians. The years since the war had seen the rapid growth of trade unions, and the emergence of the colony's first political party--the Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights. The colonials had demanded and secured a measure of representation in the legislative council, the government machinery of the colony. There was agitation for full internal autonomy. Such ideas were intolerable in Falangist Spain, yet large numbers of Spaniards were engaged in daily commerce with the Spanish-speaking residents of Gibraltar where these ideas were flourishing. It was important that the discipline and tranquility of neighboring Andalusia not be undermined by the spread of liberal thought from Gibraltar.

Finally, Gibraltar offended the sensitive Spanish temperament in two further ways. First there was personal insult. Spanish guest workers in Gibraltar were treated as second-class persons by both the British and the Gibraltarians. They held only the tough, manual labor jobs in construction, the trades, and domestic service which neither of the other groups would accept, and they were paid lower wages than the permanent residents (though significantly higher wages than they might receive for the same work in Spain).

They were discriminated against in other ways, such as being subjected to identification checks as they entered each morning, being required to carry official passes at all times, and being forbidden to remain in the town overnight. Although the evidence indicates that most Spaniards who worked in Gibraltar were perfectly happy to endure such discrimination in exchange for the opportunity for a good job, it is totally in character for other Spaniards to take personal affront at the shabby treatment of their countrymen by the foreigners in Gibraltar. [Refs. 56 & 57]

A second and more important offense was the perception of national insult which the presence of British Gibraltar caused among Spaniards. Demonstrating this situation through allegory to a British friend, a Spanish lawyer proposed the following: In exchange for Gibraltar, the Spanish would receive a certain rocky promontory near Dover to do with as they pleased. On that promontory they would build a naval base and a fort, whose guns would point at the mainland, as did those of Gibraltar. Residents of the promontory would observe Spanish law and custom, to include tolerance of homosexuality and death by garroting in case of capital offenses. The promontory would be a free port, into which all goods could flow free of duty; Spain, however, would not concern itself with the disposition of these goods, and possibly some of them could slip into England without being taxed. There would be a bullfight every Sunday, and an open gambling casino. English workers, entering as commuters, would be paid Spanish wages and be subject to Spanish trade union laws. In the event of war, England would not have the right to use the facilities of the

promontory for her own defense, but would have to respect the right of Spain to declare the neutrality or combatant status of the territory. Should it be captured by an enemy of Spain, England could not use this as a pretext to enter the promontory and reassert her claim. And, finally, should Spain decide to cede the promontory to another state or to grant it sovereignty unto itself, England would have to accept whatever disposition Spain selected without recourse. [Ref. 58] This comparison, although it has legal shortcomings, nonetheless clearly illustrates the emotional issues involved for Spain.

2. The British Position

The British response to Spain's renewed claim of sovereignty was, of course, negative. British pride and tradition were as deeply tied to Gibraltar as was Spanish pride. Since the successful defense of the Rock against the Great Siege of 1779-1783, the strength and health of England and the Empire had been linked symbolically to Gibraltar. "Steady as the Rock" had real meaning to many in England. A more pragmatic reason for clinging to Gibraltar was the strategic value of the place which, though no longer as great as it had been in the days of sail, was still significant. In 1954, Britain had not yet removed itself from "East of Suez", and its interests in the Mediterranean were significant.

There also were more noble reasons for rebuffing the Spanish, the most important of which was genuine support for democratic traditions. Spain was under the Fascist hand of Franco even while the Gibraltarians were moving toward democracy in their own way. Even Englishmen of short memory had not forgotten that in WWII, only a decade past at this time, the Gibraltarians had stood up for Britain when days

were darkest for the Allies, and it appeared that Franco might give Hitler leave to move through Spain and attack Gibraltar. [Ref. 59] Britain could not, and would not, abandon such loyal and unwilling subjects to a Fascist military dictatorship. The subjects certainly were unwilling, for it has often been said of the Gibraltarians that they consider themselves "more British than the British". [Refs. 60 & 61] As long as the residents of the Rock were opposed to Spanish sovereignty, British surrender of Gibraltar to Franco was unthinkable. Britain based its defense against the Spanish charge of colonialism on international law, citing the Treaty of Utrecht and the subsequent affirmations of British possession contained in the treaties of 1763 and 1783. [Ref. 62]

3. The Gibraltarian Position

The people of Gibraltar are of unique heritage. Their only association with Spain is through language: Spanish forms the basis of the language of family life on Gibraltar. However, there is almost no literature in the Spanish tongue. English is the formal language of business, government, and education. All commerce and writing are, by choice, in English. Culturally the Gibraltarian has his roots in England, which has controlled his home since his family first arrived.

The original Spanish population of Gibraltar was evacuated from the peninsula when it was captured by Rooke in 1704. Only about 100 civilians remained, these being mostly Genoese fishermen and a few Jews. The only Spaniards who remained were those invalids too ill to move, and one priest who refused to leave his church in the hands of the Anglican heretics.

Thus today, the population of Gibraltar has few cultural or blood ties with Spain, but is rather the product of immigrant parentage. The largest percentage of today's residents trace their heritage back to northern Italy, with smaller proportions of Portuguese, Irish, Jewish, Moorish, and Maltese ancestry. There is a significant minority of people with Spanish blood, but these are either the offspring of mixed marriages between Gibraltarians and local Spaniards, or the decendents of Spanish political refugees from the 19th century.[Ref. 63]

Essentially there were four reasons why the Gibraltarians strongly opposed Spanish claims to sovereignty over their home. The first was their English heritage and identity, which they feared they would lose if absorbed by Spain. The second was the economic advantage which they enjoyed under British rule. They had low taxes, received subsidies from Britain, and benefitted from British wages in the shipyards, port, and peripheral trades which supported the British military presence. Not insignificant in 1954 were the profits which many Gibraltarians shared from illegal commerce with Spain. [Ref. 64] The third reason was the democratic freedom they enjoyed under Britain which would have been forfeited had they fallen under Franco's rule. The final reason was that, like the Spanish and the British, the Gibraltarian pride had been offended in the dispute. They had been insulted by the Spanish, who regarded them as a temporary and fabricated population. [Refs. 65 & 66]

4. The Legal Questions

Had the legal issues of sovereignty been as clear-cut as the first paragraph of Article Ten of the Treaty of Utrecht appears to make them, then in all likelihood the Spanish claim would have been

dismissed quickly, even in the favorable environment outlined above. But the remaining provisions of the Article introduce enough ambiguity into the meaning of the first paragraph to invite further scrutiny of the entire question. This has proven most unfortunate for the British and Gibraltarians.

The greatest degree of uncertainty revolves around the second paragraph of Article Ten, which states that:

> . . . the Catholic King wills, and takes it to be understood that the above-named propriety be yielded to Great Britain without any territorial jurisdiction, and without any open communication by land with the country roundabout. [Ref. 67]

What does the phrase "without territorial jurisdiction" mean? The British maintain that it means without jurisdiction over the country roundabout. Some maintain that it means without jurisdiction over adjacent waters (or airspace) which normally would accrue with sovereignty. The Spanish maintain that it supports their contention that Spain yielded only the rights to the fortification (in effect, base rights) without yielding its claim to sovereign jurisdiction over all of Gibraltar. The phrase concerning land communications, which the Spanish have used to justify the subsequent closing of the land border, also has been subject to various interpretations.

At various times, Spain has claimed that the entire Article Ten has been rendered void by unilateral British actions which violated the provisions of the treaty. These provisions are the agreements which state that Britain will allow neither Jews nor Moors to reside in Gibraltar, and that, should Britain ever choose to alienate itself from the propriety, "the preference of having the same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others". The first objection

is clearly technical, and one which Spain has not vigorously pursued for obvious reasons. However, Spain invokes the second clause to prohibit the transfer of autonomy to the Gibraltarians, thus preventing the British from freeing themselves from the problem by granting independence to the colony.

Some Britons argue that Gibraltar is effectively British by right of conquest which predates the Treaty of Utrecht. However, the Spanish effectively counter this argument by pointing out that when Admiral Rooke captured Gibraltar in 1704, he did so with an allied fleet of English and Dutch warships acting on behalf of the Hapsburg pretender to the throne of Spain, Charles of Austria. Furthermore, Rooke's expedition was under the political command of the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, acting as Charles' agent, who subsequently appointed the Count of Valdesoto as the first Governor of Gibraltar. Spain maintains that Gibraltar was captured by, and for, a Spaniard.

The uncertainty introduced by the various interpretations of these clauses and events provided the opening which the Franco government needed to introduce its claims before the United Nations in 1956.[3]

C. CLOSING THE GATES

By 1954, both the motives and the favorable environment for reassertion of Spanish claims to Gibraltar had been established. All that remained was for a catalyst to spark the debate. The announcement by

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[3]Fawcett's article [Ref. 54] contains a full and lucid discussion of the legal questions argued from the British perspective. For a discussion of the arguments from a Spanish perspective, see Stewart [Ref. 55], Chapter 27.

Britain in early April that the Queen would visit Gibraltar provided that spark, and Franco decided to seize the opportunity to renew the conflict with Britain. Claiming that the sole purpose of the Queen's visit was to embarrass Spain and to reassert British sovereignty over the colony, the indignant Spanish Government condemned Britain because it had not been consulted before the visit was announced. The issues of discrimination against Spanish workers and smuggling were trotted out to justify Spanish concerns. [Ref. 68]

In reprisal for the visit, Spain announced plans to close the Consulate in Gibraltar permanently on May 1, to seal the border on May 10 and 11 during the Queen's visit, and implied that it could not guarantee the safety of the royal family during their stay in Gibraltar. [Ref. 69] It seems highly unlikely that there was any substance to the implication. Nonetheless, whether in retaliation or in genuine concern for the Queen's safety, early in May Britain responded by commencing security checks of all incoming Spanish laborers. The security checks resulted in delays of up to two hours for laborers entering Gibraltar on foot from Spain. Although the greatest effect of the checks was the disruption of Gibraltar's economy, Spain interpreted them as an intentional insult. [Ref. 70] The Spanish response was to begin delaying automobile traffic departing Gibraltar by requiring thorough searches of each vehicle. [Ref. 71]

The controversy did not resubmerge following the Queen's visit. Although the border was reopened, the vehicle searches continued. The Spanish Government ceased issuing work permits for Spanish laborers to enter Gibraltar and began requiring visas for persons entering Spain from Gibraltar on British passports. The threat implied in the first

action was that Spain eventually would choke off the supply of labor upon which Gibraltar's economy depended. The Franco government could not do this all at once, for the income of these laborers made a significant contribution to Spanish hard currency income, and there were no jobs available in Spain to replace those lost on the Rock. By denying applications for new work permits, over a period of years Spain gradually could reduce the dependency of the neighboring economy on Gibraltar's industries, and develop other sources of foreign exchange.

The second action was purely a gesture of harassment. For, since the Consulate in Gibraltar was not closed, a visa could be obtained only by traveling in person from Gibraltar to London to make application. [Ref. 72] A diplomatic war of words between London and Madrid followed, with the Spanish Government reasserting an old claim that the Churchill government had promised to cede Gibraltar to Spain in return for Spanish neutrality in World War II. [Ref. 73]

In 1956 Spain presented its claim for sovereignty before the United Nations General Assembly. It was not until 1963, however, that the UN Special Committee on the Situation With Regard To the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (hereafter gratefully referred to as the "Committee of the 24") actively began to consider Spain's claims. Spanish concern by this time was heightened by on-going negotiations for additional autonomy for Gibraltar.

In July 1964, Gibraltar received its first constitution, which forms the basis of the constitution in force today. The constitution provided for internal self-government through a Legislative Council composed of 11 elected members, and two members appointed by the Governor (who was

himself still an appointee of the Queen). The nominal head of government would be the Chief Minister, selected by the Legislative Council from among its elected members. [Ref. 74] The new constitution was immediately attacked by Spain as a British ploy to defuse the decolonization issue.

The first government under the new constitution assumed office on 10 September 1965, and Chief Minister Joshua Hassan found his first duty to be the defense of his position before the Committee of the 24 which was considering the Gibraltar question at Spain's urgent request. At the United Nations, Hassan and Peter Isola, the head of the opposition party in Gibraltar, succeeded in convincing the UN Committee that Gibraltar was, in fact, moving toward a genuinely noncolonial position. As a result of their successful presentation in New York, the recommendation of the Committee did not condemn Britain, but limited itself to calling for joint negotiations to resolve the dispute--a measure far less than Spain had demanded.

Following the 1965 Committee of the 24 resolution, Britain's initial position was that it would not meet with the Spanish while the border restrictions were in effect, and that it was willing to "discuss" the situation but would not "negotiate" the question of sovereignty. "Negotiation" implied a willingness to accept something less than full sovereignty. But under constant pressure of world opinion, and with a genuine belief that its position was justified, Britain dropped the semantic debate and agreed to meet with Spain in a first round of talks in May 1966. The talks collapsed in the autumn with the two sides still far apart. The immediate cause of the collapse was the emergence of a new subissue concerning sovereignty over Gibraltar's airfield which had been built in the traditional "no-man's-land" between the Rock and the

mainland. It was clear, however, that the talks were not going anywhere anyway. Spain's best offer in exchange for sovereignty over the peninsula had been a long term agreement for continued British military use of the port and airfield, and recognition of the resident's "special relationship" with the United Kingdom. Britain was willing to give Spain control of the port and dockyard, and to establish joint arrangements for controlling smuggling. Under no circumstances was it willing to concede sovereignty to the Franco government. In October and November, Spain's immediate response to the collapse was the application of the additional restrictions.

In addition to the curtailment of new work passes, Spain already had forbidden British citizens of Gibraltar to maintain residences in Spain, and had begun requiring special passes for vehicles entering Gibraltar from Spain. The airfield dispute led to new Spanish restrictions prohibiting British aircraft from overflying Spanish territory during takeoff or landing approach. Eventually a prohibited zone for commercial aircraft was established east and west of Gibraltar, and overflight of any part of Spain by British military aircraft was banned. [Ref. 75]

The year 1966 ended with a minor British diplomatic victory. Considering the resolution prepared the previous year by the Committee of the 24, the UN General Assembly accepted an amendment from Sierra Leone which required that Spain and Britain consider the desires of the people of Gibraltar in their negotiations over the future of the colony. [Refs. 76 & 77]

The two nations did not meet at the negotiating table in 1967. The "siege" of Gibraltar was tightened still further by the prohibition of

bicycles at the border crossing, and by a ban prohibiting Spanish women from working in Gibraltar (presumably to spare them from being forced to do demeaning domestic work). [Ref. 78] In June, Britain announced its intention to conduct a referendum on self-determination in Gibraltar, at which time the Spanish invoked the clause in the Treaty of Utrecht which prohibited the transfer of sovereignty to any nation except Spain. In spite of pressure from the Spanish, the referendum was carried out on 10 September, and resulted in resounding support for the British position. From an electorate of 12,757, a total of 12,182 votes were cast. Those in favor of continued association with the United Kingdom numbered 12,138; those in favor of accepting any form of Spanish sovereignty numbered 44. [Refs. 79 & 80] British elation over the referendum was short-lived, however.

Supported by a loose coalition consisting primarily of Latin American, Arab, and Communist nations, Spain successfully called for UN condemnation of the referendum. The majority position in the General Assembly was that paragraph six of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was the most relevant issue in the situation. This document declared that "any attempt at partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity was incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations Charter". The minority position argued that the principle of self-determination as expressed in the UN Charter was the more relevant issue.

The majority accepted Spain's argument that Gibraltar's population was not the legitimate historical population of Gibraltar but a fabrication of the British. The Assembly adopted a resolution calling for both nations to ignore the results of the referendum and proceed with

negotiations toward the resolution of the issue. [Refs. 81 & 82] The Spanish customs post at La Linea was closed (meaning that no goods of any kind could cross the border in either direction), and on 25 October the frontier was closed to all but pedestrian traffic. On 2 November the Spanish Government began refusing to honor passports issued by the government of Gibraltar at any of its entry points. [Ref. 83]

Britain and Spain sparred over Gibraltar for two more years, but by this time it was becoming clear that both parties were tiring of the conflict and wished to get on with the task of improving relations. Unfortunately, a mutually acceptable formula continued to elude them. Spain clarified its earlier offer to recognize the special relationship of the residents of Gibraltar to the United Kingdom. In return for sovereignty, the Spanish offered to allow Gibraltarians to retain their British citizenship and municipal autonomy on a parallel with the Basque provinces.

In Gibraltar, fear that Britain might find such an offer attractive led to the growth of a movement calling for integration into the United Kingdom. The British were unwilling to accept this proposal, but did agree to negotiations for a new constitution for the colony. Although the British Government was reluctant to accept any reform which would cause further deterioration of relations with the Spanish, domestic sympathy for Gibraltar's plight forced it to accept a constitutional linkage clause proposed by Gibraltar. Under the new constitution, the form and powers of the Gibraltar Government essentially were unaltered from those under the 1964 constitution. The linkage clause insisted upon by the Gibraltarians was inserted in the constitution's preamble, and reads:

> Her Majesty's Government will never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes. [Ref. 84]

Agreement on the constitution was reached on 24 July 1968, with the constitution to take effect in the following year upon the election of a new government in Gibraltar. Spain expressed its protest in what had become the traditional manner: it sealed the last remaining holes in its siege-wall. As elections approached in the summer of 1969, the gates at La Linea were permanently closed, removing from Gibraltar's labor force the last 4,500 Spanish workers. Overland telephone and telegraph lines were cut, and the last direct link with the neighboring Spanish countryside, the Algeciras ferry service, was terminated. By October, Gibraltar's isolation was complete.

D. A MOVE TOWARD MODERATION

In November 1969, barely one month after the last link between Spain and Gibraltar was cut, Sr. Lopez Bravo replaced Sr. Fernando Castiella as Franco's Foreign Minister. Castiella long had been personally associated with Spain's campaign to regain control of Gibraltar, and was the chief architect of the strategy of isolation which had brought Britain and Spain to their present circumstances. Although it is not known whether the Gibraltar situation was the immediate cause of Castiella's removal, it certainly did nothing to enhance his effectiveness as a Foreign Minister. Spain was no closer than ever to achieving its objective in Gibraltar, where the resident population by now had developed a deep distrust and dislike for its Spanish neighbors. With Britain's aid, the economy of Gibraltar was successfully weathering the

sanctions imposed by the Spanish. The only clear effect of the policy was to bring relations between Spain and Britain to a new low.

The appointment of the new Foreign Minister signaled a major turning point in Spanish foreign policy. No longer satisfied to be an isolated state on the perimeter of Europe, whose closest friends were Third World states in Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa, Spain began seeking recognition as a genuine member of the Western European community in every sense. Although the decision to seek NATO membership was still years away, politically astute Spaniards were beginning to talk of membership in the EEC. The probability that Britain would soon join that organization made her a more important friend.

To be sure, the hard-liners in the Spanish Government still held most of the power, and Sr. Lopez Bravo did not have a free hand in forming his policies. There was danger that any significant public back-off from the earlier official position would be labeled a sellout. Thus the moderation took the form of reducing the diplomatic conflict to a lower level of intensity rather than reducing the already imposed Spanish restrictions.

The first manifestation of the policy was the proposal to postpone UN debate on the Gibraltar question during the 1969 General Assembly session. The postponement eventually was extended through 1972. In 1972, Lopez Bravo met twice with Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary. Both men agreed that an overall improvement in relations between the two nations was more important than the immediate resolution of the Gibraltar question, and Lopez Bravo may have indicated privately that he was resigned for the time being to acceptance of the British position that there could be no change in the status of Gibraltar without the consent of its residents. [Refs 85, 86, & 87]

The decision by Spain to let the Gibraltar issue move to the back burner is reflected in British press coverage of the issue, which declined sharply after November 1969. Other than routine news about elections and normal diplomatic meetings which mentioned Gibraltar within the larger context of the article, the Economist, for example, ran only four features on the Gibraltar question in the years 1970-75 as compared to 20 articles between 1965 and November 1969.

The death of Franco in November 1975 did not result in any immediate change in Spain's policy regarding Gibraltar. The primary interest of the new government was completion of a successful and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy, a necessary condition for which was the avoidance of domestically controversial issues. King Juan Carlos, and later his Prime Minister Adolpho Suarez, had to deal with the same strong, hard-line power elite as had Lopez Bravo, and upsetting that group by publicly backing off on the Gibraltar issue would not have been good politics. The King's first official statement regarding Gibraltar indicated that he would be even more diligent than Franco in pressing Spain's claim to sovereignty. Insisting that Spain's claim was no mere creation of Franco's, Juan Carlos declared that the claim "has formed a continuous part of Spanish foreign policy since 1713, and when I become head of state I shall be even more demanding about it". [Ref. 88]

As the transition to democracy moved toward completion, Spain quietly began new initiatives on the Gibraltar question. Joint talks between the Spanish and British were held in 1976 and 1977, with very little press coverage and none of the public posturing which had marked earlier discussions. In 1977, telephone service was restored between Gibraltar and

Spain. In 1978, permanent working groups were established to pursue the issue. Finally, in the spring of 1980, the four years of quiet discussion produced results. The Lisbon Accords on the reopening of the Gibraltar frontier were announced on 10 April. In these accords, the two nations proposed:

> . . . to resolve the Gibraltar problem in a spirit of friendship and in accordance with the appropriate United Nations resolutions. The two governments have agreed . . . to open negotiations with a view to settling all their differences over Gibraltar. [Ref. 89]

The Spanish won a British promise that future cooperation would be on the basis of full equality of rights (measures to end the perceived insults to Spaniards in Gibraltar?), that the UN resolutions would form the basis of the negotiations, and that both governments would be prepared to consider any proposals which the other might wish to make. Through Spanish acceptance of a clause recognizing that Britain was obligated to honor the "freely and democratically expressed wishes of the people of Gibraltar", the British won Spanish recognition of the rights of the Gibraltarians. It was agreed that all preparations for the restoration of normal communications between Gibraltar and Spain should be completed by 1 June, although no firm date for the opening of the border was set. [Refs. 90, 91, & 92]

Unfortunately, the promise of the Lisbon Accords has yet to be realized. Spanish preparations for the reopening of the frontier have dragged out. At first the government of Spain declared that the delay was only administrative, and that such projects as the construction of a new customs facility and a suitable parking lot took more time than expected. But it soon became apparent that there was more to the Spanish

foot-dragging than administrative red tape. The government seized on the issue of rights for Spanish workers equivalent to those of EEC guest workers (Gibraltar has a reciprocal workers rights agreement with the EEC) as an excuse for delaying action further [Refs. 93 & 94], but it was becoming apparent that the Suarez government was having trouble reconciling the powerful right-wing hard-liners to the new agreement. [Ref. 95]

The coup attempt of February 1981 further weakened the UCD government's ability to chart its course from a position of strength with regard to the country's right-wing element, and it was probably pressure from the right which prompted the King to announce his decision to boycott the royal wedding in London when it was made known that the Prince of Wales and his bride would stop in Gibraltar during their honeymoon.

As previously discussed, Spain's new Prime Minister Sr. Calvo-Sotelo has made full integration of Spain into NATO the top priority of his foreign policy. Recognizing that some kind of breakthrough on the Gibraltar question is a necessary precondition for smooth British ratification of Spanish accession, Calvo-Sotelo has decided to press ahead on the Lisbon Accords in spite of resistance from the right. In this case, concern for the appeasement of Spanish conservatives is outweighed by concern for the effect of an international issue on domestic politics.

Feeling in Britain is strong enough on the Gibraltar issue that, although ratification might not be completely blocked, a long and acrimonious debate surely would result if there were no breakthrough. Such a debate would be an embarrassment to the Spanish Government which would seriously flaw what Calvo-Sotelo hopes to present to his people as a

major diplomatic triumph. Consequently, the negotiating teams have quietly continued to work toward fulfillment of the Lisbon Accords throughout 1981.

On 8 January 1982, Prime Ministers Thatcher and Calvo-Sotelo met in London. At the conclusion of the meeting it was announced that the two had agreed to set 20 April 1982 as the target date for the reopening of the frontier. [Ref. 96]

E. DISCOMFORT IN GIBRALTAR

Through the years, the residents of Gibraltar have watched the diplomatic maneuvering of Spain and Britain with increasing discomfort. Their constant fear is that they will be abandoned by a Britain tired of the economic and political liability of Gibraltar. Their concerns have not been eased by the decreasing strategic importance of Gibraltar. The Royal Air Force already has withdrawn from Gibraltar; the number of port calls by warships has decreased sharply (largely as a result of reduced British naval presence worldwide); and the dockyards now are scheduled to be closed in 1984. [Ref. 97] The Gibraltarians were quick to sense Britain's desire to get on with the task of improving relations with Spain, and their reaction generally has been to seek increasingly stronger commitments of linkage from the British Government.

The constitutional debate of 1968 was an early example of the desire for a stronger commitment, and pressure from Gibraltar resulted in the British acceptance of the amended preamble. In the 1969 elections, the first under the new constitution, the Integration With Britain (IWB) Party of Robert Peliza was able to form a controlling coalition in the Legislative Council. Although his victory was partly the result of an

internal dispute within the dominant coalition led by Joshua Hassan, much of Peliza's support was based on reaction to threatened Spanish sanctions and the desire for stronger ties with Britain. Peliza's overtures for full integration with Britain were firmly rebuffed by London, as they had been in the past, and the Chief Minister effectively was told to cool the rhetoric and get in step with the low-profile strategy being pursued in Madrid and London. [Refs. 98 & 99] When the labor party of Mr. Hassan was returned to power in 1973 it was not because of reduced public concern for the linkage issue, but rather because Mr. Peliza's government had proven itself inept both in civil administration and in diplomatic dealings with Great Britain.

In the election campaigns of 1976 and 1980, a very few Gibraltarian politicians endorsed a compromise with post-Franco Spain. In both instances, however, these candidates finished far down in the balloting and won no seats under the proportional representation formula of Gibraltar's constitution. [Refs. 100 & 101]

In the 1980 election, public pressure forced the labor party to take a strong stand opposing the recognition of the UN resolutions as the basis for negotiations following the Lisbon Accords. In spite of the strong stand, the party's share of the vote dropped from 40 percent in 1976 to 39 percent in 1980. Mr. Joe Bassano of the Gibraltar Socialist Labor Party, whose campaign was particularly anti-Spanish, gained most of the votes lost by Mr. Hassan's party. Mr. J. E. Triay, the leading candidate favoring compromise with Spain, received less than three percent of the vote. [Ref. 102]

The Gibraltarians regard the British Nationality Bill now before Parliament as an indicator of the degree of British commitment to their

cause. The Commonwealth Act of 1962 took from the people of Gibraltar (as it did from those of all Britain's remaining colonies) the recognition of status coequal with British subjects in the United Kingdom. Most significantly, it removed their guaranteed right of free immigration to the United Kingdom. The Gibraltarians have been trying since 1962 to get that right restored. The British position always has been that no restrictions ever will be placed on Gibraltarian immigration, but they have been unwilling to offer a guarantee with the force of law.

The British Nationality Bill before Parliament further distinguishes three separate types of citizenship for Her Majesty's subjects: British citizenship (for residents of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man); citizenship of the British Dependent Territories (which would apply in the case of Gibraltar); and British Overseas citizenship--the least British of the British. Against the firm opposition of the Thatcher government, the Gibraltarians seek a special amendment which would make them "first class" British citizens under the law. The House of Lords passed such an amendment on the day following the announcement by Spain that King Juan Carlos would boycott the royal wedding. The Commons have rejected such an amendment once; the two houses now much reach a consensus on the amendment [Refs. 103 & 104]

There is no ambiguity in the Gibraltarian position. The residents of the Rock are leery of Spanish promises to guarantee them municipal autonomy, citing the Basque and Catalan disputes as sufficient reason to avoid placing themselves in jeopardy on that score. They also are less than convinced of the long term stability of Spanish democracy, fearing that a return to dictatorship could threaten even the most

secure legal guarantees. And, not the least of considerations, they are reluctant to give up the tax, tariff, and public subsidy benefits which they enjoy under British sovereignty. Any attempt by Britain to compromise their position will be resisted vigorously in Gibraltar.

F. THE OPTIONS

The opening of the gates at Gibraltar after 12 and one-half years, if it comes about as expected in April, will be a major breakthrough for Britain and Spain. It will help create a more favorable environment for resolution of the dispute than has existed since the 1950's, but will not by itself move the two nations any closer to a permanent settlement. The basic issue, which is the question of who will exercise sovereignty over Gibraltar, will remain unresolved.

Four basic options have been discussed over the past 27 years for the resolution of this issue. The first is acceptance of the status quo: i.e., permanent recognition of British sovereignty, or Britain's right to confer upon the Gibraltarians whatever form of government they should democratically request. This option has been unequivocally rejected by Spain and is not a negotiable option. Should any Spanish Government desire to forsake the country's historical claim to the peninsula, such action would be interpreted as a betrayal by both the right and the opposition party. The government would almost certainly fall over the issue.

A second option is British acceptance of the Spanish claim to full sovereignty. This option is equally unlikely to be acceptable. Legally, the British appear to have the more secure claim, for they have offered on several occasions since 1964 to submit the dispute to

the International Court of Justice for resolution, and in each case the Spanish have refused their offer. More important, the British have made a genuine commitment to honor the rights of the people of Gibraltar and to date have reaffirmed that commitment in every negotiation with the Spanish. Sympathy in Britain for the Gibraltarian position might make uncertain the future of any government which abandoned this commitment.

A third and possibly more attractive alternative is the idea of a "condominium" arrangement for shared sovereighty. Several variations of this idea have been proposed since 1966, with the most popular variation modeled after the principality of Andorra. Andorra has two heads of state--the President of France, and the Spanish Bishop of Urgel. Each appoints representatives to administer the state, and there is a local assembly elected by the citizens. Such a system has been proposed for Gibraltar, with the additional stipulation that citizens of Gibraltar would hold both British and Spanish citizenship. [Refs. 105 & 106]

This proposal leaves too many questions unanswered. How, for example, would power be apportioned between the two heads of state and the elected assembly? What type of citizenship would the Gibraltarians, who do not now have "first class" British citizenship, receive from Spain? Under whose legal code would the state operate? Even if the issues were resolved to each party's satisfaction at tne time of agreement, what would prevent some unforeseen difficulty from arising later to threaten good relations between the principals? One does not have to have a terribly good imagination to conceive of

circumstances which might make Gibraltar NATO's next Cyprus under such an arrangement. Images of British and Spanish troops fighting to protect their constituent populations should be serious enough to concern European diplomats. Because of the complexity of the issues, none of the parties has shown inclination to consider this option seriously.

The fourth option, the one toward which Spain and Britain seem to be moving, is some variation of a plan which would utilize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the framework for a compromise form of shared sovereignty. What is unclear is exactly how such a proposal might work. The Sunday Times reported in August 1981 that Calvo-Sotelo's Foreign Minister, Sr. Perez Llorca, had offered a new compromise to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, at a private meeting near Madrid on 16 August. The heart of the compromise was believed to be a proposal that Spain accept the present constitutional form of government in Gibraltar in return for Britain's surrender of the naval base to NATO, with the understanding that NATO would designate a Spanish Admiral to command the base. [Refs 107 & 108]

Two critical flaws in this proposal were quickly recognized. Under the constitution of Gibraltar, the Commander of the Naval Base is also the Governor of Gibraltar, and in that capacity has the power to override even the Legislative Council if he sees fit. British surrender of the Command of Gibraltar to a foreigner, especially a Spaniard, would amount to de facto surrender of sovereignty. The Gibraltarians were quick to denounce such a possibility. [Ref. 109]

The second flaw concerns the role which NATO would be expected to play in the administration of Gibraltar. Command of the base would be a normal responsibility for NATO to assume. Administration of the

civilian community, de facto sovereignty over the territory, clearly would be beyond the scope of the Alliance charter. Although there has been no official comment from Brussels on the matter (no proposals have been formally submitted), it would be wise for the Alliance to be very cautious about assuming such responsibilities in this volatile situation.

Later speculation about the direction of negotiations has hinted that the Spanish might be willing to allow Britain to retain command of the base on the condition that the base be made a NATO command subordinate to a Spanish NATO Mediterranean commander, probably based at Cadiz. [Refs. 110 & 111] Such a proposal would be a major and unexpected concession from the Spanish, and might remove the Gibraltarian objections. But it would not overcome the concept's second flaw, since presumably NATO would still exercise ultimate responsibility for all of Gibraltar. Whether the Alliance should, or legally could, accept such responsibilities is questionable.

G. CONCLUSIONS

Clearly Britain and Spain are moving toward a solution to the Gibraltar problem. The movement has been accelerated by the Calvo-Sotelo government's decision to push for immediate integration into NATO, and as soon thereafter as feasible into the European Economic Community. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a report on 28 August which called for quick resolution of the Gibraltar issue. The report recommended that the British and Gibraltarians yield to the Spanish demand of status coequal to EEC members for Spanish laborers in Gibraltar, and declared that relations between Spain and Britain were more important than the Gibraltar question. [Ref. 112]

On 4 September, Spanish Defense Minister Oliart announced that recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar would not be a precondition for NATO membership. At the same time, he indicated that Spain would claim NATO command over the Strait of Gibraltar, including the military base at Gibraltar. [Ref. 113] In an interview with the Madrid newspaper ABC on 5 September, Foreign Minister Perez Llorca made the most comprehensive and conciliatory statement to date on the status of negotiations. Affirming that NATO entry would help decisively in resolving the Gibraltar issue, he warned against those who demanded a solution to the problem before entry. Such people, he declared, were only using the issue as a pretext to create opposition to NATO membership for Spain. Perez Llorca praised the fairness and recommendations of the Commons Committee report, proclaiming that the government of Spain fully shared Britain's view that relations between the two nations were the most important aspect of the dispute. Most significant of all, he publicly recognized that Britain's commitment not to transfer sovereignty over Gibraltar involved a principle which would have to be respected, stating that he believed a solution could be found which would not jeopardize that principle. [Ref. 114]

At this point it is clear that, although negotiations are proceeding in a new environment of understanding and friendship, and although the border at Gibraltar apparently will be reopened shortly, the realization of a permanent solution to the Gibraltar question remains a distant goal. Britain will not yield on her commitment to the democratic rights of the people of Gibraltar, and those people are not yet ready to consider acceptance of Spanish sovereignty, whether de jure or de facto. Because

both Britain and Spain now recognize that improved mutual relations are more important than continued bickering over the Rock, a temporary and "satisfactory" solution will be found which will allow Spain's graceful integration into NATO. The emergence of democracy in Spain has made this possible, and the priorities of the democratic Spanish Government have determined that it will be so.

The wound will be dressed, but it will not soon heal. Clearly both Britain and Spain hope that time will be the great healer. The reopening of the border, and the simultaneous closing down of British dockyards, will force Gibraltar to develop closer economic ties with neighboring Spain. Perhaps the Gibraltarians will view the sovereignty issue less emotionally after a generation of friendly relations and close economic ties with their Spanish neighbors. But until this happens, Britain and Spain are counting on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide a framework for a temporary solution. During the interim, friction between the three principals will continue. How that friction affects NATO in the future will be a function of how successfully Spain is integrated into the European community, and what role the Alliance chooses to accept in the administration of Gibraltar.

IV. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL: DEFINING A PLACE FOR SPAIN IN THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

A. OVERVIEW

Separated from the remainder of Europe by the Pyrenees, Iberia stands alone on the continent's southwestern flank. Although geographically a single unit, Iberia is divided politically and culturally into two units--Portugal and Spain. The accession of Spain into NATO will link Portugal geographically to the other continental members of NATO, and enhance the maritime strategic value of Iberia in both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Achieving the greatest benefit from these developments will require a reorganization of the command structures of both the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Developing command structures which are politically acceptable to both Portugal and Spain will be the most difficult aspect of reorganization, for these nations are particularly sensitive to issues involving national prestige.

A charter member of NATO, Portugal lies isolated from the other members of the Alliance, surrounded on the north and east by Spain, and on the south and west by the Atlantic. Portugal's strategic value to NATO lies in its dominant position in the eastern Central Atlantic, buttressed by possession of the Madiera and Azores Islands. Within the NATO military command structure, Portugal's most significant contribution has been in the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT). A major subordinate commander for SACLANT, COMIBERLANT is responsible for about 600,000 square miles of the Atlantic from the Tropic of Cancer to the northern

border of Portugal, and ranging westward some 500 miles from the Strait of Gibraltar. Because of its isolation, Portugal currently maintains a unique position in NATO's military command structure as the only continental member whose territorial defense is not the responsibility of a major Allied Commander. The continental responsibilities do not extend beyond the Pyrenees for SACEUR, while the responsibilities of SACLANT stop at Portugal's 12-mile Atlantic territorial limit. [Ref. 115]

Unlike Portugal, Spain is connected directly to the rest of Europe through France, and Spanish Iberia has both Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Under the present NATO military command structure, the Mediterranean waters of the Spanish eastern shore of Iberia are the responsibility of SACEUR's subordinate, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). The country's southern Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Cadiz, as well as the territorial waters surrounding the Spanish Canary Islands off the coast of Morocco, lie within the area of responsibility of COMIBERLANT. Spain's northern Atlantic coastal waters, off Cape Finisterre and the Bay of Biscay, lie within the area of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, East Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT), another SACLANT subordinate located in Northwood, U.K.

Both Spain and Portugal informally have expressed concern over the question of command structure reorganization. As the debate over NATO membership was approaching its climax in Spain in the early fall of 1981, the topic of command realignment began to be addressed in the press. According to one Spanish hypothesis, the most strategically effective structure would be a joint Iberian command within NATO. The proposal had military merit, for it recognized the geographic unity of the peninsula

and would allow both states to respond flexibly to interests in the Atlantic or Mediterranean. But the Spanish Government was quick to disassociate itself officially from the proposal. Spanish Defense Minister Oliart told the press:

> . . . although the Iberian area is a single geographic and possibly strategic area, Spain's entry into NATO should be effected respecting the two countries' sovereignty and individuality because the good neighborliness and good friendship between Spain and Portugal are based precisely on that . . . any other formula could bring into crisis or affect that relationship. [Ref. 116]

Portuguese Defense Minister Sr. Freitas do Amaral forcefully rejected the joint command proposal. Stating that his government fully appreciated the comments of the Spanish Defense Minister, Amaral cited three reasons for Portugal's rejection of a joint command: the first was historical and political, the second echoed Olivart's concern for continued friendly relations between the two nations, and the third was strategic. Amaral remarked that Spain's interests were primarily in the Mediterranean, while Portugal was better suited to continue to support NATO's Atlantic role. He concluded that, in the Portuguese view, the Iberian Peninsula should be divided into two geo-strategic zones: one turned toward Europe, and the other toward the Mediterranean area. [Ref. 117]

To understand the intense jealousy with which Spain and Portugal guard their national identities, and the effect which this will have on shaping a new NATO command structure, it is necessary to understand the background of the present situation with regard to each of the three explanations offered by Sr. Amaral. This chapter will examine those explanations: the historical and political context of Iberian


SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
50N
COMIBERLANT AREA
Madrid
40N
Lisbon
Balearic Is.
Azores
Madiera Is.
30N
Canary Is.
Tropic of Cancer
20W
10W
0
10E
20E

Figure 2

development, the bilateral relationships between the two states, and the strategic relationships between the two states relative to the defense of NATO.

B. THE HISTORICAL DIVISION OF IBERIA

1. The Emergence of Portuguese Identity

Many foreigners fail to discern any great distinction between Spain and Portugal. Both are Latin nations which share a common heritage and parallel development. Social and political evolution have been remarkably similar with common periods of Roman, Germanic, and Islamic influence, Catholic monarchy, revolutionary republicanism, and reactionary dictatorships. Some see Portugal as little different from the provinces of Spain save that Portugal historically has been more successful in resisting the imposition of Spanish domination. In the eyes of many Portuguese, most Spaniards feel:

> . . . a Portuguese is not a Spaniard. No Portuguese would say otherwise. . . . Spaniards, however, may take exception to such a statement, for the belief is traditional in Spain that the unitary quality of the peninsula is the important fact. [Ref. 118]

Perhaps it is because of this perception that the Portuguese so aggressively assert their independent prerogatives. Whatever the reason, the roots of Portuguese independence date from pre-Roman times and remain a dominant force in shaping Portuguese character today.

The Romans moved into Iberia in the third century B.C. to check the spread of the power of Carthage. As allies against Carthage, they were welcomed by the peoples of the warm, dry Mediterranean regions. The southern Iberians shared many cultural similarities with the Romans, being previously well-acquainted with Mediterranean civilization through

contact with the Greeks and Phoenicians. With the peoples of the northwest, however, the Romans shared little in common. These people had little previous contact with other Mediterranean civilizations, having been influenced more strongly by their Celtic neighbors to the north. The Celticized peoples of northwestern Iberia resisted the domination of Rome, and it was to facilitate the pacification of these peoples that the Romans built the great network of paved highways traversing central Iberia. Throughout the period of Roman domination of Iberia, garrisons were maintained in the northwest provinces to ensure the subservience of these peoples.

As Roman power waned, the vacuum in Iberia was filled by migrating Germanic tribes and, ultimately, by the Roman proxies, the Visigoths. The Germanic tribes entered the peninsula across the Pyrenees and lived in peace with the Romans and Iberians for about a generation before the Romans departed. At least four distinct Germanic tribes entered the area, each maintaining its integrity rather than mixing with the other tribes. The Suebics, an agricultural civilization, selected the cool, moist northwestern region of Iberia as their area, settling the regions of the Minho River basin and Galicia.

The Visigothic army which entered Iberia from Gaul in 415 carried a Roman mandate to rid the peninsula of the Germanic Barbarians. When the power of Rome collapsed, the Visigoths succeeded the Romans as rulers of Iberia. Only the Suebics were able to resist conquest by the Visigoths, maintaining an independent kingdom until 585. Even after 585 the Suebic civilization was able to maintain its distinct identity in the security of

the mountains of the northwest, absorbing the culture of the earlier, Celticized inhabitants of the region.[4]

Visigothic domination ultimately crumbled as effective administration deteriorated into constant feudal bickering. First invited into the peninsula as an ally by one of the waring factions, the Islamic Berbers and Arabs remained as conquerors when they recognized the disarray of the Visigothic political system. Within two years, by 713, they had completed the conquest of the peninsula, meeting only limited resistance centered in the northwest. Finding the cool, wet northwest region not to their liking anyway, the Moslems were content to withdraw south of the Douro River, only occasionally sending raiding parties north to insure the subjugation of the Christianized Iberians to Moslem authority. It was from the largely Visigothic and Suebic Christain communities of the north and northwest that the future power of both Spain and Portugal was to grow. Under the leadership of Pelayo, a Goth, and later his son-in-law, who became known as Alfonso I, a resurgence of Christian power began in the province of Leon. It was Alfonso I who devised the strategy of development which would assure the ultimate emergence of Portugal as an independent state.

Alfonso's strategy required a buffer between his developing kingdom and Islamic power. To create this buffer he withdrew all Christian

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[4]Stanislawski [Ref. 118] refers to the Germanic tribe which settled the Iberian northwest as the Swabians rather than the Suebics. The Swabians were in fact one branch of the Suebic peoples, but in common usage the term Swabian is reserved for those Suebic peoples who settled the Central European region known as Swabia, while the more general term Suebic is used to refer to the peoples who migrated to Iberia.

settlements from the area between the Minho and Douro Rivers and from the high plain or mesa south of Leon, leaving the region a political "no-man's-land". The security provided by the buffer allowed the strength of Leon and Asturius to grow until a successor to the crown of Leon, Alfonso III, felt that his position was secure enough to begin resettlement of the area. At Alfonso III's command, the high mesa was resettled by peoples of southern extraction, decendants of the Visigoths, while the Douro-Minho region was resettled by the peoples of Suebic extraction from the Coimbra and Porto regions. The administration of the Minho region was separate from that of Galicia, each region being placed by the King under the administration of Gauls of the House of Burgundy. Thus the region under the administration of Henry of Burgundy and his wife Theresa (an illigitimate daughter of Alfonso III) emerged as a distinct unit in north-west Iberia to become the political base of the future state of Portugal. [Ref. 119] About this same time the region between the Minho and Douro came to be called the province of Portucalense, after the town of Portus Cale (now Porto) at the mouth of the Douro River. [Ref. 120]

From the time of its emergence as a political unit, the history of Portucalense and the other Iberian provinces is characterized by a constant series of crises and wars of royal succession. William Atkinson calls it "the old familiar pattern . . . (of) revolts of nobles against the throne, violent dispatches, repudiated elections, alliances with the enemy without, civil war". [Ref. 121] He might well have added intrigue, conspiracy, and assassination to his list. It was during one such crisis of succession when the authority of Leon was weakened by an internal power struggle and constant combat with Islam that Affonso Henriques was able to unilaterally proclaim an end to Portuguese subjegation to the

crown of Leon. He consolidated his rule by defeating the forces loyal to his own mother, Theresa, and exiling her from the lands south of the Douro. In 1139 he proclaimed himself King of Portugal, a title recognized by Alfonso VII of Spain in 1139, and confirmed in 1179 by Pope Alexander III. [Ref. 122]

2. Maintaining Portuguese Autonomy

Recognition of the Crown of Portugal could not alone guarantee the security of the state. Between 1128 and 1814, Portugal frequently found itself defending its independence against the ambitions of stronger Spanish monarchs. The causes of the wars were nearly always disputes over the right of succession. The intermarriage of royal families brought both nations into conflicts over territorial claims not only in Iberia, but in Italy, France, Sardinia, and Corsica. It was through one of these intermarriages that the crowns of Spain and Portugal were temporarily reunited in 1580. Philip II of Spain, a Hapsburg, acceded to the throne of Portugal when the Portuguese house of Aviz passed without an heir. As the nearest surviving relative, Philip claimed and secured the hereditary crown. During his reign, he continued to allow Portugal to function as an independent state, with Portuguese holding the positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy. But his successors, Philip III, and Philip IV of Spain, placed increasingly tighter reins on Portuguese autonomy, replacing the Portuguese court with Spanish functionaries. These policies gave rise to growing resentment, and in 1640, John, Duke of Braganza, led a successful revolt against the Castilian crown. Spain at the time was burdened with another revolt in Catalonia and a foreign

war with France, and ultimately was forced to recognize the independence of Portugal in the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668. [Ref. 123] In discussing the events of this period, Stanley Payne says:

> None of this, however, had the effect of blurring Portuguese interests. Autonomy for domestic government and for the Portuguese empire maintained steady continuity of basic Portuguese institutions and the occasional Hapsburg attempts at interference provoked sharp discontent. In the late sixteenth century, association with the Hapsburg crown seemed to benefit Portugal's primary interests. When that ceased to be the case a half century later, national spirit came to the fore and seized the first good opportunity to end the dynastic association. [Ref. 124]

In the age of empire building, and later in the decline of imperialism, Portugal and Spain experienced coincidental patterns of development and deterioration. The age of empire began with the Portuguese expedition to conquer Ceuta in 1415. Organized by John I and his English wife, Philippa of Lancaster, it was the first venture by either state beyond the confines of Iberia. [Ref. 125] Throughout the 15th and 16th centuries, the rapid expansion of the empires of both Spain and Portugal brought the two nations into frequent conflict and dispute. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI sanctioned the division of the unexplored world between Spain and Portugal. The Treaty of Tordesillas, signed one year later, gave Brazil to Portugal and fixed the global perspectives of each nation for centuries to come. [Ref. 126] Spanish interests were to be dominant in the Mediterranean and the New World; Portuguese influence was concentrated in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, with settlements in the Azores, Madieras, Africa, and Brazil making the Atlantic a virtual Portuguese lake. The Portuguese view of their role in NATO today can be seen as a direct manifestation of this 15th century Atlantic perspective.

Portuguese foreign policy always has had as a primary concern the preservation of Portuguese autonomy relative to its stronger neighbor, Spain. First cooperation and then alliance with England has been a lynchpin of that policy. The first contact with the English came in the southward expansion of Portugal to its present size in the 1140's. Porto became a stopping place for crusaders embarked for the Holy Land by sea. They were welcomed effusively by Affonso Henriques, and were persuaded by him to aid in driving the Moslems from the area which is now southern Portugal before they pressed on to the Levant. Embarking his own forces with those of the crusaders, Affonso conducted an invasion by sea of the Tejo River basin, and succeeded in defeating the Moslems. Many English crusaders were among those who fought for his cause, and one of them, Gilbert of Hastings, remained to become the first Bishop of Lisbon. [Ref. 127] The first commercial alliance with England was concluded in 1294, with a fishing rights treaty following in 1353, and the first military alliance in 1380 or 1381. [Ref. 128] In 1385, English military power was decisive in the defeat of the forces of the Spanish state of Castile at the Battle of Aljubarrota, and securing the claim of John I to the throne of Portugal.

> Out of that victory, and of that change of dynasty, came in 1386 the formal alliance-'forever'-with England. Reaffirmed down the centuries as a sheet anchor in the policies of both countries, the today oldest alliance in existence, it bound alike the two thrones and two peoples to the defense of each other's interests and territories. [Ref. 129]

In subsequent years the English alliance was to prove crucial to Portugal's survival. English forces were a factor in the Portuguese revolt against Hapsburg rule at the end of the period of the Union of the Crowns (1580-1640). Portugal and England were allies against Spain

in the War of Spanish Succession, in which Portugal lost Ceuta to Spain. In the Napoleonic Wars, English forces helped secure Portuguese independence after combined French and Spanish armies invaded Portugal in 1801, and again in 1807.

3. The Modern Iberian Struggle: Liberalism or Conservatism?

The independence and security of Portugal were finally assured by the Congress of Vienna and the rise of liberalism in Iberia, which turned the energies of both Spain and Portugal inward for the next one and a half centuries. Spain was a leader in the movement toward nationalism and liberalism at the beginning of the 19th century, and the pattern of liberal and reactionary conflict which emerged in Spain was repeated in other countries throughout the continent.

> Spain first captured the imagination of patriots and reformers in central Europe with the national rising against Napoleon. Subsequently, the 1812 Constitution (of Spain) served as an inspiration to liberals in Italy and Portugal, and Spain in fact led the process of political democratization in Western Europe until 1843. . . . The Spanish pattern of conspiracy and revolt by liberal army officers . . . was emulated in both Portugal and Italy. [Ref. 130]

Ultimately the liberal movement in Portugal proved stronger and more stable than that of Spain, for the Portuguese were able to establish a constitutional monarchy which functioned fairly effectively, though not without difficulty, until 1910. On the other hand, Spain was unable to form any lasting government. Continually troubled by conflict between liberal and reactionary forces, and unable to form a popular consensus, the Spanish people suffered through the two Carlist Wars and numerous periods of government crises and paralyses between 1812 and 1923.

At the onset of World War I, the Portuguese Government was in the hands of a radical republic dominated by a new middle class, while Spain

was struggling to preserve the existence of the latest government of its constitutional monarchy. Portuguese sympathies, especially those of the liberal Democrats, were with the Triple Entente. Winning power in the elections of 1915, the Democrats succeeded in getting Portugal into the war as an ally of Great Britain by seizing 36 German ships which had been blocaded in the Tejo River, and turning them over to the British. Germany declared war on Portugal shortly thereafter. [Ref. 131] The energy of Spain was absorbed during the war years by the struggles to subdue Kabyle rebels in Morocco, and to suppress rising regionalism in Catalonia and the Basque provinces. These internal problems finally led to the collapse of the constitutional government in 1923, and its replacement by the liberal dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The fall of the Portuguese republic to a bloodless military coup in May 1926 placed all of Iberia under authoritarian rule.

Spain tried once more to establish democratic rule in the inter-war period when Primo de Rivera, in ill health, was dismissed by King Alfonso XIII in 1930. Although Primo had intended his dictatorship to be an interim government, maintaining power only until stability could be reestablished, the institutions of democracy proved hard to rebuild. The republican government which succeeded the dictatorship was never able to fashion a coalition which could govern effectively. The goals of the first government were an inconsistent mix of factional objectives including the reduction and reformation of Army power, complete separation of church and state, Catalan autonomy, and a vague commitment to social and economic reform. [Ref. 132] These goals proved inconsistent with the greater needs of the nation, and were beyond the ability of the government to implement. As the decade advanced, the government

became more and more radically revolutionary, partly in response to the rise of Fascism in other parts of Europe. Finally, the radical policies of the government triggered a revolt in 1936 which led to the bloody Spanish Civil War and the fall of the government to the forces of Franco in 1939.

4. From Dictatorship to Democracy

Unlike other governments of Europe, Portugal refused to observe neutrality in the Spanish Civil War, and from the beginning, clearly aligned itself with the forces of Franco and General Mola. The Portuguese Government saw the war as a threat to its own authoritarian rule, and took steps to facilitate a victory for the conservative forces.

> In Portugal, under the dictatorship of Antonio Salazar, the silent masses would have welcomed the victory of the Popular Front (republican left) as a step toward their own liberation. But the government and the military have given every facility to the insurgents during the preparation of the revolt, and from the first day of the civil war, Portugal was a thinly disguised base of supply for the insurgents. [5] [Ref. 133]

Portugal was the first state to support Franco openly by sending a representative to his headquarters in December of 1937. At the conclusion of the Civil War, Spain and Portugal quickly signed a treaty of mutual friendship--the first such treaty between the two nations.[6] [Ref. 134]

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[5]This statement is not precisely true, since Salazar was nominally the Minister of Finance at the time, while the head of government was Antonio Oscar de Fragase Carmona, but it is true in essence, since Salazar held most of the reins of power behind Carmona.

[6]The only earlier agreement was the Quadruple Alliance, in which Spain and Portugal both participated following the Napoleonic Wars. However, this was not an alliance of friendship, but rather an attempt to stabilize power relationships in Europe among the signatory states.

Both Spain and Portugal were able to maintain their neutrality during the Second World War, but only through great tenacity and delicacy. Although Franco owed a debt of gratitude to Germany and Italy for their aid during the Civil War, he knew that the stability of his economy and his government could be jeopardized by foreign commitments which over-extended his power.

> From the start . . . Franco carefully measured his pro-German orientation. Each change in the international situation increased his wariness, and he knew enough about war and Spain's own weakness to prefer continued neutrality. . . . By 1943, the Spanish regime had developed a three-war theory of the global conflict: in the war between Communists and anti-Communists in eastern Europe, Spain was declared to favor the German anti-Communists. . . . in the war between the Axis and the Allies in western Europe, Spain was neutral; in the struggle between the western allies and Japan in the Far East, Spain favored the allies. [Ref. 135]

The Salazar government of Portugal, although dismayed by the German attack on Catholic Poland, still was careful to avoid involvement in the war. Britain let it be known that she would accept Portuguese neutrality as fulfillment of the obligations of the old alliance between the nations. During this time, the only pressure on Portugal came after the United States entered the war. Bases in the Azores were essential to the American war effort, and in 1943 Portugal bowed to Allied pressure by granting port and air facilities. [Ref. 136] Despite this concession, however, Portugal retained a nonbelligerent status. The 1939 Treaty of Friendship between Portugal and Spain was expanded into a mutual consultation pact after the fall of France, and the two nations emerged from the war closer politically than they had ever been.

After the war, both nations were the targets of scorn from the victorious liberal Europeans, but Spain more so than Portugal. The Soviet Union made both the target of "anti-Fascist" propaganda campaigns,

along with Sweden, Switzerland, and Argentina. [Ref. 137] Spain's association with Germany in the days of the Civil War, and its obvious attempt to play the winds of fortune to advantage during the course of the war, brought the sternest condemnation from other Europeans; Portugal's traditional alliance with Britain, and firm neutral position (which leaned toward the Allies if it leaned at all), left that nation with better postwar European relations than Spain. In 1949, Portugal was invited to become the only nondemocratic member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, largely at the insistence of the United States, and with the support of her old ally, Great Britain. The reason for U.S. insistence on Portuguese participation was the dominant position of Portugal in the Atlantic, and her control of the Azores, an essential link between North America and Europe. [Ref. 138] Portugal favored Spanish membership in NATO in 1949, but the northern European refusal to accept Franco as an ally was absolute. [Ref. 139]

During the decade of the 1970's, both nations moved from dictatorship toward democracy. Commencing with a coup in 1974, and teetering on the verge of radical liberalism and communism before the power of the center was reasserted the following year, Portugal's transition initially was more uneven. Today the Portuguese Government has nearly completed its transition to democracy, although the Military Council of the Revolution still retains certain veto powers.

Spain's transition was less traumatic, as a surprisingly smooth transition to constitutional monarchy followed the death of Franco in November 1975. The democratic movement in both nations has been welcomed enthusiastically throughout Western Europe, but domestic challenges

to the stability of democratic institutions remain present in both. The final chapter in the struggle for control of the government between various elements of Iberian policy has not yet been written for either state.

5. Current Implications

Although Spain and Portugal share a common heritage and similar development, their friendship is relatively recent. Historically, interests of the two have more often clashed than coincided. Prior to the Congress of Vienna, Spain and Portugal were frequently on opposite sides in military confrontations, with Portuguese autonomy always in the balance. The only precedent for a true alliance between Spain and Portugal has been the personal alliance of the two Iberian dictators, Franco and Salazar. While the convergence of present interests of the two states makes continued friendship desirable for both, a strong tradition of competition and insecurity remains in the relationship, especially for the historically weaker partner, Portugal. This tradition helps explain the jealousy with which the Portuguese guard their national identity, and the concern of the Defense Ministers of both nations that any restructuring of the NATO command respect the individuality of both.

C. BILATERAL TIES BETWEEN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

In view of the long history of conflict and suspicion between Spain and Portugal, it should not be surprising that bilateral social and economic ties between the two nations are limited. In spite of their common border, the two states actually have been quite isolated from one another geographically. Differences in language and global perspective have increased their social and economic isolation.

The lands which lie along the border between Spain and Portugal tend to be what Stanislawski calls "zones of indifference". These areas are sparsely populated and of little economic significance. In the north, the border is mountainous; in the south it is hot and arid. Transportation routes across the border are limited. There are only four railroad border crossings and seven major roadway crossings. [Ref. 140] Although much of the Spanish high central plain is drained by the six rivers which flow from Spain into Portugal, none of these rivers is navigable above the border. Spanish commerce to and from the interior flows through Spanish ports on the Bay of Biscay, Gulf of Cadiz, or the Mediterranean Sea rather than through the Portuguese ports of Lisbon or Porto. This limits commercial contact between the states. [Ref. 141]

Language acts as a further barrier to commerce between the states. The Portuguese language is a remarkably uniform language throughout the country, and contains many more words of Celtic or Germanic origin than the Spanish languages. Within Spain, four different languages are spoken: Castilian or classic Spanish, Catalan, Basque, and Gallegan. In general, these languages have stronger roots in Latin and Arabic than the Portuguese language. The exception is Gallegan, the language of Galicia, which virtually was indistinguishable from Portuguese until the 15th century, and which remains quite similar. Castilian Spanish is the national language of the government of Spain, and the one which diplomatic and commercial relations are conducted. [Refs. 142 & 143]

The effects of geographical and linguistic separation are reflected in the statistics on tourism and travel for the two nations. In 1975

4.8 million Portuguese crossed the Spanish border, a figure equivalent to half the population of Portugal, and 14 percent of Spain's total tourist volume. But the Spanish Government estimates that most of these Portuguese were transients, enroute to and from jobs in Europe beyond the Pyrenees. A very low proportion actually remained to visit or conduct business in Spain. [Ref. 144]

On the other hand, 52 percent of Portugal's tourists in 1973 were Spanish. This figure also is somewhat misleading, for the majority of these were excursionists, crossing into Portugal for one-day visits to the beaches of the Gulf of Cadiz, spending very little money, and developing no permanent relationships. [Ref. 145]

Military and security relations between the two nations remain good, but are not extensive. The Iberian Pact agreement, dating from World War II, was allowed to lapse following the transition to democracy in both nations. There is a military officer exchange training program between Spain and Portugal, but it is small in scale and only one of several similar programs conducted by each of the nations. [Ref. 146] During the interlude between the Portuguese coup in 1974 and the death of Franco in 1975, there were minor problems with militant Portuguese right-wing radical organizations operating from bases within Spain. However, since the establishment of the reign of Juan Carlos, there have been no further problems. [Ref. 147]

Surprisingly, commercial trade between the two nations is limited. The elements of isolation discussed above led to the development of historical trade patterns which remain largely unchanged today. Great Britain has been a major trading partner of Portugal since the time of the reconquest. Portuguese membership since 1972 in the European Free

Trade Association and the combined EFTA/EEC free market has tended to direct her trade toward northern Europe and away from Spain--not a member of either organization. Colonial trade, which historically accounted for a large proportion of Portuguese commerce, has been replaced to some extent by a greater European connection. [Ref. 148] Spain under Franco tended to be more autarkic than Portugal, and only during the last 15 years of the dictatorship did the country develop a strategy for international trade. Because the United States was one of the few developed nations willing to open trade relations with Spain in the years after World War II, it became Spain's major partner in the 1950's and 1960's. Since the mid-1960's, Spain has been developing her European trade, but failure of the EEC to accept Spain as a member has slowed the process. [Ref. 149] Finally, commerce between Spain and Portugal also tends to be limited because the two nations have duplicate economies: that is, the products and resources of each tend to compete with rather than complement the products and resources of the other. [Ref. 150]

In 1980, Portugal ranked 33rd among nations in imports to Spain (23rd if petroleum imports are excluded), and seventh among nations in value of Spanish exports purchased. Expressed as a percentage, trade with Portugal accounted for less than 0.5 percent of Spain's import volume, and only 2.7 percent of her export volume. At the same time, Spain was ninth among purchasers of Portuguese exports, and sixth in value of goods sold to Portugal. (Iraq, from whom Portugal purchased most of its oil in 1980, was the only oil-exporting nation ranked ahead of Spain.) This amounted to 3.5 percent of Portuguese exports, and 5.7 percent of her imports. These figures represent a stable pattern since

1975. The only significant changes reflect the rapidly increasing price of petroleum and the dismantling of Portuguese interests in the former colony of Angola, which has disappeared as a major trading partner of Portugal. In 1979, the value of Portuguese exports to Sweden, Switzerland, and Belgium/Luxembourg all exceeded the value of exports to Spain. [Refs. 151 & 152]

The relationships between Spain and Portugal today are friendly, but the ties are not nearly so strong as those that bind other NATO member states. There are no dependency relationships, and it is clearly the desire of both nations that this remain so. Spanish investment in Portugal, for example, is limited by Portuguese concern to avoid Spanish economic domination. [Ref. 153] The economic and social costs of any future political rift between the two states would therefore be low.

The absence of strong bilateral ties which might cement the friendship between Spain and Portugal helps explain why both nations are approaching the issues of NATO command reorganization cautiously. The phraseology selected by the Spanish Defense Minister to describe his nation's position regarding these issues takes on greater meaning when viewed in the context of limited relations between the states. Oliart chose his words carefully and precisely when he said that any NATO command realignment which fails to respect the "sovereignty and indivduality" of both might "bring into crisis" the relationship between the two states.

D. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS AND THE DEFENSE OF NATO

In the islands and enclaves of the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, Portugal and Spain retain a legacy of their years of Empire. This legacy plays a major role even today in shaping the way each of the nations perceives the role it should play in NATO, and indeed in shaping how NATO perceives the strategic contribution of each.

For the Portuguese, the legacy sustains the Atlantic perspective first stirred to life in the conquest of Ceuta in 1415. The Portuguese continental land mass is small compared with the vast expanse of ocean within the "Portuguese Triangle" formed by the Madieras, the Azores, and the mainland. The Madiera Archipelago lies some 650 miles west-south-west of Gibraltar, 500 miles off the Moroccan coast at Casablanca and 700 miles southwest of Lisbon. The Azores lie further into the Atlantic, 1000 miles west of Porto, centrally located within the basin east of the mid-Atlantic ridge. The area enclosed by this triangle includes over a third of a million square miles of ocean. The Portuguese mainland faces entirely on the Atlantic, presenting a coastline of some 450 miles and the major ports of Lisbon and Porto. The strategic significance of facilities located in the triangle is unmistakable. From bases in the Azores, NATO can control both the lines of communication from the South Atlantic to Central Europe, and the northern approaches to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.

The Madiera Islands control the southern approaches to the Mediterranean, and provide a base from which to extend the protection of vital European oil supply routes around the hump of Africa to the Tropic of Cancer--the limit of NATO's area of concern. It has been said that

65 percent of Western Europe's oil, and 57 percent of all other major import commodities pass through the Portuguese Triangle enroute to Europe. [Refs. 154 & 155] The mainland itself offers port and air facilities necessary to the Alliance for logistic and administrative support of any action in Southern Europe, and which could perform the same functions relative to the Central Front if required.

Most of the area of the Portuguese Triangle lies within the NATO area of responsibility of the Commander, Iberian Atlantic. IBERLANT is strictly a maritime command, its only responsibility ashore being the subordinate Madeira Islands Command. The primary responsibility of IBERLANT is control of the Atlantic approaches to Gibraltar--a necessary precondition to support of the successful defense of Southern Europe. The eastern limit of IBERLANT's responsibility is at five degrees, 55 minutes west longitude, just on the Atlantic side of Gibraltar beyond Spanish and Moroccan territorial waters. The headquarters of COMIBERLANT is ashore at Oeiras, near Lisbon. The commander always has been an American Rear Admiral, the current encumbant being Radm. Tyler F. Dedman. Prior to Dedman's arrival, however, the post was temporarily held by the Portuguese Deputy Commander, Rear Admiral Elias de Costa. [Ref. 156] Radm. Dedman is scheduled to depart in 1982, and beginning at that time, a firm commitment has been made to assign permanently a Portuguese officer as Commander. [Ref. 157] Simultaneously, IBERLANT is to be upgraded from "Commander", to "Commander in Chief" status--it is to become CINCIBERLANT, with a Portuguese "three star" replacing the American "two star" Admiral.

COMIBERLANT has no forces permanently assigned, but during wartime would take command of those naval and air forces assigned to him by

SACLANT. Although in wartime all of Portugal's meager naval forces would be absorbed by IBERLANT, the greatest part of the forces required to perform the command's mission would have to come from other NATO nations, primarily the United States and United Kingdom.

The defense of continental Portugal is a national responsibility, with neither SACEUR nor SACLANT charged with coordinating the defense of the nation. In addition to its national defense commitment, the Portuguese Army is tasked by NATO to supply one division to CINCSOUTH for the defense of Southern Europe. However, since the Angola War and the 1974 coup, the Portuguese Army has been in disarray and the requirement has been waived. Currently Portugal only has one Brigade, the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade, earmarked for NATO defense. [Ref. 158] The Portuguese Air Force has only limited capabilities, and would probably divide its resources between ground support for the Portuguese Brigade in Southern Europe, and national surveillance and defense in the Atlantic coastal area. [Ref. 159] The ground support capability will be improved over the next two years with the acquisition of two squadrons of American A-7 aircraft, but the total number of tactical aircraft will not be increased significantly owing to the retirement of older aircraft.

Portugal has enjoyed its special status as the key to NATO control of the South-Central Atlantic and the Mediterranean approaches. The Portuguese are well aware that the strategic value of the Portuguese Triangle is what first convinced the Allies to invite them to join the Alliance, and they are reluctant to share the leverage and prestige which this position offers. Regarding Spanish entry into NATO, and

the restructuring of command, they are nearly unanimous. Says Portuguese defense analyst Alvaro Vasconcelo:

> The accession of Spain to the Alliance is, from the Portuguese point of view, both desirable and necessary. First, because NATO will thereby be reinforced, which is in the interest of Portugal. Secondly, because of the bearing that accession may have on the consolidation of democracy in Spain. Nothing would be more harmful to Portugal than a new dictatorship in Spain. . . . There is nonetheless room for some concern in civilian and military circles as to the distribution of NATO commands once Spain becomes a member of the Alliance. For historical and psychological reasons . . . it would seem desirable to share tasks between Spain and Portugal. Some people maintain that Spain has a more Mediterranean vocation while Portugal has an Atlantic vocation. [Yet . . .] there can be no doubt as to the importance of simultaneously reinforcing the defense agreements between the two Iberian countries. [Ref. 160]

Vasconcelo's viewpoint has been echoed in the left and right wing press in Portugal. Reporting for the leftist daily Espresso in September 1981, Miguel Almeida Fernandes stated that the position of Portugal should be one of total opposition to unified command in Iberia, and that Portugal should insist on the creation of a second, separate command for Spain when accession takes place. [Ref. 161] Tempo, a conservative journal, has voiced similar concerns. Among Portuguese problems associated with Spanish accession, declared Tempo, will be the risk of accepting inferior status relative to Spain. Of particular concern in this regard will be the division of responsibilities within the NATO command structure. [Ref. 162]

The implication is clear: Portugal hopes to retain the dominant position in the Atlantic. The nation's leadership appears willing to consider sharing the responsibility for the defense of the peninsula with Spain. As to the SACLANT command structure, however, the Porguguese consider IBERLANT and the Portuguese Triangle to be their sacred realm.

While the Portuguese talk about their Atlantic Triangle, the Spanish talk about their strategic Balearic-Gibraltar-Canaries Axis. [Ref. 163] The axis reflects the traditional Spanish preoccupation with a North African threat which predates even the Spanish possession of Morocco and the war against the Kybyle rebels, going back to the time of the Moslem occupation of Iberia. The Balearic Islands are located in the western basin of the Mediterranean, east of Valencia and midway between Spain and Sardinia. The Canary Islands are in the Atlantic, 800 miles southwest of Gibraltar, and 275 miles south of Portugal's Madeira Islands. A line drawn from the Balerics to the Canaries, through Gibraltar, roughly defines the traditional "front line" of Spanish defense against the threat of Islam. Lying along the axis, just inside Gibraltar on the African coast of the Mediterranean, are the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, legal claim to which is disputed by Morocco.

In addition to the Moroccan claim against the enclaves, Spain also is troubled by an Arab and Communist backed separatist movement in the Canaries, and by bickering between Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Polisaro guerrilla forces over sovereignty in the former territory of Spanish Sahara where Spain still has important political interests. Seeing a parallel in the eighth century conquest of Iberia by Islam, many Spaniards are more concerned today by the tnreat of Communist influence in the Mahgreb and West Africa than the threat of a Communist invasion through Western Europe. The southern threat remains an important determinant of national policy. Despite the wishful thinking of some Portuguese, it is clear that a portion of this southern tnreat originates on the Atlantic side of the Strait of Gibraltar.

The unstable situation on the Atlantic coast of North Africa does not represent Spain's only Atlantic interest. Over 40 percent of Spain's coastline and the majority of her ports are located on the Atlantic. Spain has a longer Atlantic coastline than Portugal. With approximately 500 miles on the north coast, and another 175 miles facing the Gulf of Cadiz on the south, Spain easily exceeds Portugal's total coastline of 450 miles. On the north coast are the major ports and shipbuilding centers of Bilbao and El Ferrol. South of Portugal are the major port of Cadiz and the Guadalquivir River, historic waterway to Sevilla. The Spanish Navy, which has more than three times the number of warships as its Portuguese counterpart, stations most of its ships and men in the Atlantic. El Ferrol is headquarters for the Cantabrian regional naval command, while San Fernando, near Cadiz, is headquarters for the Straits command. [Refs. 164 & 165] The Spanish also are quick to point out that possession of the Canary Islands, and control of the coastline contiguous to the approaches to Gibraltar, places Spain in a better position to control those approaches than Portugal.

With interests as important as these in the Atlantic, understandably Spain is less than eager to forego participation in the NATO command of the area. But, unlike the Portuguese, the Spanish have yet to agree fully among themselves regarding the role their nation should seek in a restructured NATO military command. For example, Minister of Defense Oliart has stated clearly that the Spanish Government's position is that Spanish national territories and territorial waters should fall within the control of a unified Spanish command in the NATO context. [Ref. 166] Yet, as discussed in the opening remarks of this chapter, Oliart previously rejected the concept of a unified Iberian command

for the peninsula owing to the problems already discussed. Oliart has not discussed how his government proposes to meet the two distinct sets of conditions, and still build an effective command structure within NATO.

One analyst who does offer a concrete plan is Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, the former foreign editor of the liberal newspaper, Madrid. One of Spain's more progressive, globally-oriented foreign policy and defense analysts, Sanchez-Gijon is convinced that a unified Iberian command is the only effective way to integrate Spain into NATO. He proposes a plan modeled after the British Channel Command as an interface between the Atlantic and Europe, responsible to SACEUR for the defense of Iberia and to SACLANT for the security of the Eastern Central Atlantic. To sweeten the pot for the Portuguese, Sanchez-Gijon proposes that the Azores be taken from COMWESTLANT and incorporated into the new Iberian unified command. [Ref. 167] This, of course, is precisely the solution which the Portuguese wish to avoid.

As Portugal is well aware, the sympathies of NATO's military strategists are likely to lie with the Spanish for a number of reasons. First the peninsula is a strategic entity, and a unified command would, in theory, provide the most effective form of administration. Military commanders will be eager to avoid possible areas of contention over command authority such as those which arise periodically in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, the division of command authority into what would amount to areas of virtual national responsibility rubs against the very premise of joint action upon which the alliance is founded. Finally, from a purely pragmatic point of view, the disparity in military capabilities between Spain and Portugal clearly weighs in favor of Spain. The Portuguese themselves are willing to admit,

however sadly, that the Armed Forces of the nation are not capable of meeting their alliance defense commitments; none of the three services is capable of meeting its ambitious commitments alone. [Refs. 168 & 169] Operating in cooperation with the Spanish Cantabrian and Straits naval forces, however, the Portuguese and Spanish jointly could assemble a naval force nearly capable of independently guaranteeing the security of the area assigned to IBERLANT. Jointly, the armies of Spain and Portugal would be adequate to assure the security of the peninsula against any anticipated threat, and combined Air Forces would be more able to provide the required support to ground forces, and fill the peninsula's air defense mission requirements.

E. NATO'S OPTIONS

The probable positions from which Portugal and Spain will begin bargaining on the command structure issue are as follows: Portugal will insist that the IBERLANT command in the Atlantic remain unaltered, suggesting that Spain be offered a Mediterranean maritime command as quid pro quo. Further, Portugal will demand that the commitment to upgrade the IBERLANT Commander's billet and fill it with a Portuguese Vice Admiral be honored.

On the other hand, Spain will request that all Spanish coastal waters, both Atlantic and Mediterranean, fall under the control of a single command headed by a Spanish Admiral. This command would include control of the Canary Island archipelago. Some Spaniards may prefer that Portugal be given a section of the present IBERLANT area as a separate command, while others will be willing to welcome the Portuguese into a joint command as junior partners--if the Portuguese accept.

Portugal and Spain may be more willing to accept a plan for a joint defense of Iberia itself, based on the precedent of the Iberian Pact. Under such a plan, a combined staff might coordinate the defense of the peninsula while combat troops remained under the command of their own officers. As a bottom line, both nations initially will dismiss, out of hand, any plan which places the control of territory or territorial waters under the command of the other nation's military control.

In this situation, room for compromise will be limited. Because of the geographical relationship between the Madeira and Canary Islands, and because the Atlantic coast of Portugal bifurcates the Spanish Atlantic coast, it will not be possible to divide the Atlantic sector into zones of national responsibility without excessive gerrymandering which would make impossible any meaningful coordination between commands. Retention by the United States of the Commander's billet at IBERLANT might make Spain more willing to accept the status quo existing in that command, but this would be totally unacceptable to the Portuguese, who have been pressuring the Alliance for this signal of prestige since the creation of the command in 1967. The creation of a separate command for the Spanish in the Mediterranean would further aggravate Portugal's Alliance relations if the IBERLANT command were not turned over to them.

Therefore, the planned transition to a Portuguese CINCIBERLANT will proceed as scheduled. It is clear that one or both of the nations will have to give way on some demands. The solution will have to be a "satisficing" one--probably the one which is least costly in terms of concessions.

Politics will take precedence over military-strategic considerations. The Alliance is, after all, an intergovernmental alliance which respects the soveriegnty and independence of member states. In assessing the costs of concessions, even in the case of military command restructuring, political costs will weigh heavier than military costs. Therefore, the restructuring solution which imposes the least political concession cost on Spain and Portugal could possibly resemble the following:

1. A joint military staff may be established to plan and coordinate the defense of Iberia. Each state will maintain ultimate control of forces on its own soil. Immediate command of all forces will be vested in their own officers, probably at the division level, but perhaps at a lower level. The joint staff will cooperate closely with SACEUR, but may not be directly responsible to him. Spain, like Portugal, may initially commit a token ground force to SACEUR, earmarked for use outside Iberia, but not predeployed.

2. SACEUR will bear part of the cost of improving the logistics and base infrastructure of peninsula facilities, but command will be retained by national authorities, as is presently the case with NATO training facilities in Portugal, and with U.S. bases in Spain and the Azores. SACEUR will have formal agreements with each state for facilities utilization.

3. Portugal will receive the command of IBERLANT as scheduled, with little modification to its boundaries. Spain will receive a subordinate Island Command for the Canaries. Based on precedent, this is a small-cost concession for the Spanish. The Azores are an Island Command under COMWESTLANT, and Iceland and Greenland also are Island Commands within zones commanded by foreign military officers.

4. Spain will receive a regional maritime command within the Mediterranean, subordinate to CINCSOUTH and SACEUR. The boundaries of the command probably will coincide with the Mediterranean portion of the United States/Spanish Zone of Common Interest (ZCI) as defined by the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two nations. The ZCI extends westward from seven degrees east longitude, and includes the Balearic Islands and Alboran Basin. As a concession to the Spanish, it is conceivable that the western limit of the command might be extended from five degrees, 55 minutes west longitude, out into the Gulf of Cadiz to about seven degrees, 20 minutes west longitude. The boundary will then coincide with the mouth of the Guadiana estuary, the boundary between Spain and Portugal. This will allow Spain to maintain the integrity of the Straits Command located in San Fernando.

5. Spain will place a senior naval officer on the staffs of both CINCIBERLANT and COMEASTLANT, within whose zone lies Spain's northern Atlantic coast.

6. Normally Spanish naval forces may not be assigned to CINCIBERLANT, but may perform only national tasking within his area of responsibility. If this is the case, CINCIBERLANT will continue to depend primarily on the United States and the United Kingdom to provide forces for assignment to his command. In terms of strategic cost, this may be the most disappointing aspect of the command structure.

The most controversial aspects of the command realignment will be those dealing with the maritime commands. Spain's claim to a maritime command in the Bay of Biscay will bring it into conflict with the interests of France, which have not been discussed in this essay.

Briefly stated, the present NATO command structure recognizes de facto French control over the old Biscay Command area, even though the French no longer officially participate in the NATO command. All NATO operations in the area, especially submarine operations, are coordinated with the French national command. There may be a "gentlemen's agreement" between NATO and France reserving the Biscay Command for France in the event that France rejoins the NATO military command. These understandings will take precedence over Spain's claim to a Biscay command. Spain will not complain loudly, for it will find it easier to accept a position subordinate to a British Admiral than to a Portuguese Admiral.

More controversial will be the relocation of the western boundary of a Spanish Mediterranean command. One reason is the relationship between the command boundary and the settlement of the Gibraltar question as discussed in the preceding chapter. If Britain and Spain agree on a settlement which places the Commander of the base at Gibraltar under the NATO command of the Spanish Admiral at San Fernando, as has been recently suggested, then both nations will lobby strongly for relocation of the western boundary to facilitate this arrangement. Relocation of the boundary will involve a concurrent relocation of the boundary between SACLANT and SACEUR areas of responsibility. SACLANT strongly has resisted similar initiatives when presented in the past, and it will be he who will probably make the final determination on such a proposal. The Defense Planning Council is unlikely to go against the recommendations of SACLANT, and the personality of the person filling the position at the time when the question is considered may be the most important single variable in shaping the final boundary.

Nonetheless, a solution such as the one outlined above, while not the most effective militarily, will require the lowest level of political concession from Spain and Portugal. It will provide each with the prestige of a NATO command and recognize in greatest measure the individuality of each.

V. SPAIN, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND CENTRAL FRONT DEFENSE STRATEGY

A. OVERVIEW

At first glance, Spanish accession appears to offer NATO a possible solution to a chronic problem, the need for a credible defense of the Central Front. Spain will bring to NATO the fourth largest army in Western Europe, and smaller but more modern naval and airforces. Even more significant may be the added territorial depth which Spain will bring to the theater. A rethinking of NATO defense strategy may be required to incorporate these assets to best advantage.

Happily, Spain seems eager to find a role for its Armed Forces in NATO. Seeking to defuse the potential for another coup attempt, the government is anxious to find a meaningful international role for the Armed Forces which will help divert the attention of the Army away from internal politics. As Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, Spain's Foreign Minister, has said,

> We've got to help those Armed Forces find a role which they haven't had since the 19th century. We are not looking for wars, but we have to change the pattern of an Army that had a colonial and internal role (but) never really an (external) defense role. [Ref. 170]

The Foreign Minister added that his government considers terrorism and the Soviet threat to NATO's central front the greatest challenges to European stability.

Given the coincidence of NATO's need, and the opportunity presented by Spanish accession, a critical examination of how the two circumstances may interact is warranted. The opening sections of this chapter will

SPAIN AND THE CENTRAL FRONT
USSR
WARSAW
PACT
NATIONS
FRG
SPAIN
Scale (miles)
0
200
400
600
800
900

Figure 3

present the background of NATO Central Front defense strategy, and discuss the credibility of the strategy in the context of current force levels. The final sections will present alternative ways in which Spanish accession could affect that strategy, and offer conclusions on how the Alliance ultimately may incorporate Spain into plans for the defense of Europe.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF NATO DEFENSE STRATEGY

The roots of NATO defense policy for the Central Front can be traced back to the Western European Defense Organization (WEDO), the planning body of the Western European Union (WEU). Under WEU mandate, this group had worked through 1948 on European defense planning problems and, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, began immediately to adapt its plans to the NATO framework. [Ref. 171]

The product which the planning group produced included three defense plans: a short term, a medium term, and a long term plan. The short term plan was responsive to the balance of forces as it was believed to exist at the time; i.e., it presumed a superior Soviet ground force which had the capability to overcome any resistance offered by the few Allied divisions then in existence and advance quickly to the Atlantic. The short term plan was essentially an evacuation plan for the withdrawal of Allied forces from continental Europe. When reinforced by newly mobilized divisions from the United Kingdom and North America, these forces would form the nucleus for a Normandy-type counteroffensive. The short term plan accepted the probability of initial Soviet occupation of the continental Alliance states.

The medium term plan was intended to provide the allies with an improved infrastructure and command organization which would allow them to defend Europe without abandoning the continent in the event of a Soviet attack. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, Allied forces in Europe were organized for occupation, not defense. Not only were the logistics support systems and types of equipment necessary to support large scale ground operations not in place, but Allied troops were widely dispersed in small and immobile units. The medium term defense plan was designed to correct these deficiencies. Realistically, through 1953 this was the plan which would have guided the course of allied actions in an European war. According to Roger Hilsman, the allied forces in Germany "would have dropped back to positions on the Rhine without attempting to fight anything but skirmishes". [Ref. 172] With the ground forces at their disposal, and with massive conventional bombing support from the American Air Force, the Allies felt that they had a reasonable chance to hold at the Rhine, and planned to launch a successful counterattack following reinforcement.

The 12 divisions and 400 aircraft then available to NATO could not, however, effectively meet even the modest objectives of the medium term defense plan against an assault of the magnitude expected. The long term plan offered an analysis of future force requirements for the defense of Western Europe in case of a major Soviet attack; i.e., it was a proposal for a future NATO force structure, rather than a strategy for utilization of existing forces.

The three WEDO plans were overtaken by events little more than a year after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, when NATO began

moving toward a new defensive strategy. The term "forward strategy" was first officially used to describe NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe at the September 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The concept was born in response to the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea, which changed Western perceptions of Soviet intentions and the means which they would use to secure their goals. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, relates of this meeting:

> . . . discussions were centered on a single problem: how to defend the NATO area from an aggression similar to that which had taken place in the Far East. . . . There was complete agreement that a 'forward strategy' should be adopted in Europe . . . in order to ensure the defense of all NATO European countries. [Ref. 173]

The real roots of forward strategy are more involved than this simple explanation implies. Korea provided the spur which prodded the Council into action, but the weaknesses of the medium term plan had been apparent much earlier.

Soviet possession of nuclear weapons made the successful completion of a Normandy-type operation doubtful. There was no room for failure in the concept of a defense along the Rhine. Should the Soviets succeed in overcoming the Allied defenses and occupy continental Europe, the probability of forcibly ejecting them at some future time would be remote. To block possible Soviet occupation, NATO needed more defensive forces of all types, and more reserve forces to shore up the defenses and wage a counteroffensive. The states which then comprised NATO had proven during the Second World War that they were capable of supporting military forces of the magnitude envisioned, but the economic and political situation in postwar Europe dictated that they would not choose to do so. Given the reality of this situation, some alternative means of

strengthening NATO credibility was sought. The alternative conveniently at hand was the rearmament of West Germany.

The leadership of the Federal Republic was eager to join in an arrangement for the common defense of Europe. Chancellor Adenauer saw such an arrangement as a way to move Germany further along the road from occupation toward sovereignty. But he faced the problem of selling the program to the nation: it was questionable whether the people would support a plan which proposed immediate forfeit to occupation a territory which included 30 percent of its population and 25 percent of its industrial base. For that matter, the same could have been said of the nations of Denmark and the Netherlands, both of whom would have been largely forfeited under the medium term defense plan. A strategy was needed which would make participation in the Alliance politically palatable for West Germany, Denmark, and Holland. Forward strategy offered the promise of achieving that result, even though the means to achieve it were not yet available. Therefore, at the September 1950 meeting in New York, the Council formally endorsed a strategy of forward defense, and set in motion a study which would determine how best to implement the strategy.

The results of that study were published in 1952 when the Council met in Lisbon. Vast force level increases were proposed to ensure repulsion of Soviet aggression. From 12 divisions and 400 aircraft, NATO military might was to be expanded to 96 divisions and 4,000 aircraft. The magnitude of the proposed increases proved to be more than the member nations of NATO were willing to pay for, even though the prospect of an Alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany hung in

the balance. European statesmen cried that neither their economies nor their electorates would support such a commitment. The Times called such a force "the maximum amount of provocation with the minimum amount of deterrent effect". [Ref. 174] Yet, it was becoming increasingly clear that the accession of the Federal Republic was necessary if the Alliance was to become a credible security guarantor of the West. Both German manpower and German territory were essential to give NATO some desperately needed continental depth. NATO faced a great dliemma: the cost of forward defense was greater than its members were willing to bear, yet the concept of forward defense was politically sacrosanct to the Federal Republic, without whose membership the credibility of the Alliance would be weak.

A search was launched for a solution to this dilemma. If the conventional forces required to support the strategy were not to be made available, another means of making forward defense credible had to be found. The doctrine of "massive retaliation", as incorporated in NCS-162 and presented publicly by American Secretary of State Dulles in January 1954, offered the alternative sought. Dulles said that in case of aggression the United States would "retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our choosing". This policy allowed the U.S., and as a direct corollary NATO, to "get and share more security at less cost". [Ref. 175] Thus U.S. nuclear might was substituted for conventional armed strength in Europe. The implications were clear: If the Soviet Union chose to invade Western Europe, U.S. strategic nuclear forces would react with devastating attacks on the Soviet homeland. Linkage was created. Conventional force level requirements could now be tailored to smaller objectives: deterring small probing actions, protecting against minor military incursions with limited

objectives, and forcing the Soviets to commit a large enough attack force to make their objectives clearly apparent, thereby ensuring that there would be no reluctance to use U.S. strategic forces. This combination of forward strategy and massive retaliation remained declaratory NATO doctrine through 1967.

As the decade of the 1950's drew to a close, however, the credibility and desirability of the massive retaliation portion of the doctrine came under increasing scrutiny in the United States. Staging from forward bases around the world in the early 1950's, U.S. strategic bombers had posed a far greater threat to the U.S.S.R. than any threat posed by the Soviets to the United States. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would be forced to back down in any confrontation, rather than risk provoking a nuclear attack by the United States. In the late 1950's however, Sputnik and the "missile gap" caused many strategists to question the supposed invulnerability of America. The total reliance of Western defense policy on America's nuclear deterrent force, left U.S. Presidents no middle ground on which to take a stand in case of confrontation. In any showdown with the Soviet Union, the choices were limited to bluff, concession, or total nuclear war. None of the choices seemed particularly attractive.

Defusing the potential for large scale global nuclear conflict became a major objective of the new American administration following the 1960 elections. With Kennedy and McNamara taking the lead, the U.S. sought to develop a strategy which could deal effectively with local aggression, yet maintain a clear "firebreak" between "acceptable" conventional warfare and unacceptable nuclear warfare. The strategy of "flexible

response", which theoretically called for Western dominance at every level of escalation, was the product of the administration's search. Under this concept, aggression would be met with force in kind; the response would be limited to the minimum required to repulse the threat, nothing more.

The economic costs of fully implementing this strategy were enormous. The Alliance essentially was facing the same dilemma as in 1952, when the member states proved unwilling to support the force levels required to make Alliance defense strategy credible. The European members of NATO strongly resisted the Kennedy initiative, accusing the U.S. of backing out of its NATO nuclear commitment, and seeking to sever the linkage between Europe and American nuclear forces. But Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon Johnson, held firm. Under great American pressure, a strategy of flexible response, still linked to forward defense, was formally adopted by NATO in 1967. This combination remains the declared strategy of NATO today.

To meet each potential threat with a response in kind, dominance at every escalation level is required. But though it has been over 14 years since the doctrine of flexible response was formally adopted by NATO, the member nations of the Alliance have shown little inclination to match Soviet force level buildups in Europe with similar quantitative and qualitative improvements in their own forces. Instead, they have chosen to rely on the threat of the first use of theater nuclear forces to deter a Soviet attack, and presumably would rely on those same forces to defend against such an attack if it should come. Intended originally as a stopgap to redress a conventional force imbalance until NATO ground

forces could be built up, theater nuclear forces have become the permanent cure-all for NATO inferiority in men, tanks, and artillery.

C. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CURRENT STRATEGY

There are many problems with the credibility of the threat of theater nuclear weapons first use. First, there is the temptation for Soviet nuclear preemption, which not only limits the military value of NATO's theater forces but makes several Alliance nations unwilling to consider the acceptance of the weapons on their soil. Fearing that the Soviets will perceive the modernization of American intermediate nuclear forces as a provocation, many of the same nations even are reluctant to discuss weapons improvement, lest the Soviet temptation to preempt be increased.

Secondly, changes in the overall strategic nuclear balance appear also to favor the Soviet Union. Clearly, by unleashing nuclear forces in the European theater, the U.S. now risks immediate Soviet escalation to a preemptive strategic attack on the continental United States. There is great doubt whether any American President would risk a nuclear attack on the United States in order to defend Europe.

In a speech in Brussels in 1979, Henry Kissinger bluntly told his audience that "we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide". [Ref. 176] Some six years earlier, former Defense Secretary Packard stated even more clearly that, in his opinion, "the United States would not use its nuclear forces against the Soviet Union short of a dire threat to the survival of the United States". [Ref. 177]

In addition to the problems of credibility, the NATO decisionmaking process can be expected to be complicated further by Soviet efforts at

deception, aimed at disguising true objectives and prolonging Western indecision. Therefore, in any case, it is not clear whether political constraints within the democratic nations of the Alliance would allow NATO to reach a militarily timely decision on the employment of the weapons.[7]

If the threat of theater nuclear weapons has been neutralized, what then serves to deter Soviet aggression, and what would defend Europe in the event of the failure of deterrence? Many believe the answer must be that conventional forces must deter conventional attack, while survivable intermediate nuclear forces are needed to deter a Soviet theater preemption. Yet, owing to the reluctance of the member nations to bear the cost of conventional defense, NATO's ground forces remain inadequate for that task.

The highly critical analysis of NATO defense capabilities presented in the Nunn report [Ref. 178] is perhaps the best-known study detailing these inadequacies. Comparison figures for 1980 show NATO force levels on the Central Front to be 27 divisions, 7,000 tanks, and 2,250 tactical aircraft, while Warsaw Pact forces include 46 divisions (26 Soviet), 19,500 tanks (12,500 Soviet), and 3,900 tactical aircraft (2,230 Soviet). The Warsaw Pact forces also maintain a 2:1 advantage in active reserve manpower. [Ref. 179]

There are studies which postulate that use of theater nuclear forces will exacerbate rather than ameliorate the East-West manpower imbalance A model developed for one such report shows that frontline forces will

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[7]For an excellent discussion of the weaknesses of NATO nuclear strategy, see Ikle, Charles Fred, "NATO's 'First Nuclear Use': A deepening Trap?", Strategic Review, Vol VIII, No. 1, Winter, 1980.

be decimated quickly in a theater nuclear exchange, and that ultimate victory will go to the side with the greater reserve forces. [Ref. 180] In his book, Europe Without Defense, General Robert Close argues that, given the current imbalance of forces in Europe, it would take a Soviet offensive only 48 hours to reach the Rhine. He is hardly alone in his concern. Other studies estimate one day to reach the Weser River, and as few as five days to occupy completely the Federal Republic and Low Countries.

Concerns in West Germany mirror concerns elsewhere over the credibility of NATO's defense strategy. From Die Zeit: "America would like to stall as long as possible any NATO use of its nuclear force in defense ow Western Europe." The result of such a lack of action would be a war of attrition which "would be sure to devastate Western Europe in general, and this country in particular." [Ref. 181]

At least some high-ranking military officers share concern, not only for the flexible response portion of NATO strategy, but for the credibility of the forward defense portion as well. In a recent proposal for West German ground force restructuring, Major General Jochen Loeser discussed the weaknesses of forward defense, concluding that the second echelon of Warsaw Pact forces would break the Weser-Lech defense line, and quickly overrun allied forces on the Central Front. [Ref. 182] Although the article scrupulously avoided recommending a defense strategy which was explicitly designed to concede territory to the aggressor, it is clear in context that this is precisely what is required if the proposals are to be implemented. Even the Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee has concluded that:

> Under present and foreseeable circumstances, it would be impossible for NATO to wage . . . a conflict without giving up significant parts of Western territory. The stark fact is that, in view of the political imperative of 'forward defense', the limited depth of NATO territory as well as the vulnerability of the Alliance's arms supplies, NATO could not resist a concerted Soviet conventional offensive. [Ref. 183]

D. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES AND THE IMPACT OF SPANISH ACCESSION

There are two possible ways in which Spanish accession might improve the credibility of NATO's Central European defense posture. The first would be if the addition of Spanish Armed Forces greatly altered the balance of forces in the theater. A radical shift in favor of the West could neutralize present Soviet advantages at the conventional level. Unfortunately, this will not be the case. Even if a majority of Spain's 255,000 ground troops were committed to NATO's Central Front, they would not dramatically alter the balance.

Owing to the present structure of the Spanish Army, the maximum commitment which Spain could make is probably much less than 50 percent of its Army. Most of the Army's manpower presently is concentrated in the widely dispersed units of the Territorial Defense Forces, and the "Overseas Forces" stationed in the Balearics, Canary Islands, and North African enclaves. The traditional mission of these units has been internal security, and the defense of the "Balearic-Gibraltar-Canary-Axis" against attack from North Africa. They are lightly armed, small, and immobile. Much of their firepower is in fixed coastal artillery. These units are not prepared to support NATO in the event of a general conventional war. Those units which could possibly aid in NATO defense are the units of the Immediate Intervention Force. This force is composed of one armored, one mechanized, and one motorized division,

supported by regimental size and smaller light artillery and engineer units. The total force numbers about 40,000 men, and would be a welcome contribution if offered to NATO, but radically short of what is required to alter the military balance. [Ref. 184]

Increasing the possible magnitude of the Spanisn contribution will take both time and money. Time will be required to reorganize and retrain the Territorial and Overseas Forces for the type of mission which they might expect in a NATO scenario. The Spanish Government already has begun this task as part of its program to move the Army away from domestic politics. The replacement of all members of the Spanish Joint Chiefs in late fall 1981 was motivated in part by this objective, as was the union of the three services under a Joint Chief in 1977.

Changes in the seniority and command structures have had a similar objective. Under the provisions of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a combined Spanish-American staff has been working on plans for joint exercises between the two nations in the Zone of Common Interest, with one goal being the familiarization of Spanish Armed Forces with Western operating procedures. Yet, in spite of the government's intentions, the reorganization and retraining will take considerable time, for there remains, especially in the Army, a strong core of senior officers who look with disfavor on attempts to reform the service. [Ref. 185]

An even more difficult problem will be financing the equipment needed to upgrade Spain's forces to NATO standards. The Spanish government has budgeted significant increases in defense spending through 1983. The sharpest rise in spending will be for investment in new equipment, and

for maintenance and readiness. The government target for defense expenditures is three percent of GNP. [Ref. 136] But much of the increase is being consumed by major item acquisition. The Spanish Navy has a major ship construction program underway, and the Air Force is negotiating to buy up to 176 American F-16 aircraft. There will not be sufficient procurement funds remaining to upgrade the Army rapidly.

With the defense budgets of other NATO nations already stretched, and with Portugal, Greece, and Turkey competing for military assistance funds, it is unlikely that NATO will help subsidize the modernization program to any great degree. Other factors which may limit Spain's ability to accelerate military procurement plans include domestic resistance to higher defense spending in the context of the nation's overall economic downturn, and as the military is professionalized, pressure will increase for higher military pay to compensate for the loss of income from second jobs (called moonlighting by U.S. servicemen). Higher pay demands will compete with procurement for military budget funds.

There is also an important question regarding the type and magnitude of force commitment Spain would choose to make even if conditions outlined above did not exist. Although the government is anxious to find an international role for the Army, the role envisioned may not include foreign basing. At present in Spain there is little domestic support for foreign basing, and the government has gone out of its way during the campaign for accession to stress that no commitment automatically is implied by NATO membership. Asked by ABC if there were any plans to deploy Spanish troops in Europe, Foreign Minister Perez Llorca stated:

> In principle, there are no plans for this. However we could have troops 'assigned' to the Federal Republic of Germany.

> In other words, troops ready for transportation to a theater of operations in Germany or Italy, the equipment and training of whom would be a wonderful task for the Army in which we would be assisted by all the Atlantic Alliance countries. But there are no plans to deploy troops outside national territory on a national basis. [Ref. 187]

It is too early to tell whether the government position will change after the accession process is complete, but given the precarious position of the UCD government, it is not unlikely that PSOE objections would block any foreign troop deployments proposed in the future. If Spain's commitment takes the form described by Perez Llorca, a commitment similar in form to Portugal's, then its forces would contribute to the credibility of NATO defenses to a somewhat lesser degree than if they were predeployed to their assigned positions. In any case, the magnitude of Spanish commitment in the foreseeable future will not be sufficient to alter the balance of forces significantly, nor greatly improve the credibility of NATO defense in the theater.

The second way in which Spain might improve the credibility of NATO defense posture would be if Spain offered the Alliance other tangible assets on which an acceptable alternate strategy could be constructed. Antonio Snachez-Gijon, author of the book España en la OTAN (Spain in NATO) and a recognized authority on Spanish defense, alluded to a possible Spanish role in an alternate strategy in a 1979 article for NATO's Fifteen Nations:

> The incipient analysis which is carried out in Spain with a view to eventual integration into NATO has recently been stimulated by observations on the value of the Iberian Peninsula as a strategic bastion, in case of a retreat of the NATO forces provoked by an overwhelming Soviet attack on the Central Front. Observations in that sense formulated by Admiral Moorer (former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) and the Portuguese Minister of Defense . . . were commented on in the Spanish press last January. In his assessment of the strategic importance of the

> Peninsula as a 'single entity' behind the Pyrenees which could serve as a bastion for an European counterattack, the ideas of the Portuguese Minister directly affect Spain. . . . There is no doubt that the new Portuguese concept, already unfolded, eventually united with Spanish perception of the strategic interests of that country as part of the Atlantic Alliance, would considerably help to strengthen Western security in general, and the defense of the peninsular nations in particular. [Ref. 188]

Spain does, in fact, offer two assets to NATO which would make the construction of such a strategy feasible. Those assets are territory and ports. The area of continental Spain is 195,000 square miles, compared to 680,000 square miles for all the other continental NATO states combined, and 388,000 square miles for the nations which face the Central Front. Spanish accession would increase by 50 percent the territory available to Central Front commanders for maneuver. That territory is imminently defensible. It is cut off from the rest of Europe by the Pyrenees mountain range, through which only one major highway, five smaller secondary roads, and four railways pass. The interior of Spain is also mountainous. Next to Switzerland, Spain is the most mountainous state in Europe. Whereas it has been estimated that it would require a force of 100 divisions to defend the broad central plain of Germany against Soviet attack [Ref. 189], the mountain passes of the Pyrenees could be secured by a force many times smaller.

Complementing this territorial sanctuary are Spanish port facilities which would allow allied reinforcements from outside of Europe to be offloaded en masse for the staging of a counteroffensive. Major Spanish ports include Bilbao on the Bay of Biscay, Cadiz on the Atlantic side of Gibraltar, and Valencia and Barcelona on the Mediterranean. Bilbao is significant for its tanker berthing facility, which can accommodate

ships of up to 500,000 DWT., and for its total berthing footage, which is significantly greater than any other Atlantic port south of the English Channel with the exception of Le Havre. [Ref. 190]

NATO's hope for a credible defense lies in the ability to get American reinforcements into the battle for the Central Front, and nearly all of those reinforcements would have to come to Europe by sea. Airlift would be able to handle only the first two and one-third divisions, for which the Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured to Unit Set (POMCUS) material is already on hand in theater. The remaining ten divisions slated for NATO reinforcement, plus any reserve and newly established divisions, would have to travel by sea with their equipment. The first equipment convoy could not be expected to reach Europe before D+32, while the first division size troop convoy would not arrive before D+70. [Ref. 191] When the convoys reached Europe, they might find no place to disembark north of the Pyrenees if estimates prove true that the Soviets can occupy quickly both Germany and the Low Countries where all of the major port facilities are located. British ports, which might still be under NATO control, are well within range of Soviet bombers, and the air defenses of the United Kingdom have been cited as inadequate. [Ref. 192] Staging through British ports also would require an amphibious operation at the outset of a counteroffensive, an undesirable idea for reasons previously discussed. Iberian ports might be the only choices for points of debarkation.

There would be some disadvantages to the use of Iberian ports. For one, the very isolation which makes Spain so defensible means that transfer of men and supplies north of the Pyrenees will be similarly restricted to a few vulnerable routes. There also is the problem of

the railroads. Spanish railways are of a different guage than standard European railways, and all supplies traveling by rail would have to be offloaded from Spanish trains and reloaded for transfer further north. Distances between Spain and Central Europe are great. From Barcelona to Frankfurt is 1300 km. If one assumes an average rail speed of advance of 32 kph [Ref. 193], then it would take 41 hours for each supply train to reach a nominal destination in Germany. There also would be the question of France's status in the war, and whether NATO supplies could pass freely through France.

Finally, Iberia's credibility as a staging area would have to be protected with large investments in air defenses (those presently in place in Spain look southward into the Mediterranean rather than toward Europe), civil defense, and possibly ballistic missile defenses. But from the NATO standpoint, perhaps the greatest limitation to the use of Spanish ports is that to plan meaningfully for such a contingency means admitting that the strategy of forward defense might not be workable. Although this possibility is discussed widely, a formal policy position which acknowledged the probability could be too expensive politically for the Alliance.

The advantages of depth and sanctuary which Spain brings to NATO are not newly recognized by military strategists. In his article on early NATO strategy, Roger Hilsman mentions twice the role which Spain might play in the earliest NATO defense plans. Regarding the short term plan, which was an emergency evacuation plan, Hilsman alludes to:

> . . . a desperate hope--which was never (formally) expressed--that Franco might let the Allied troops pass through Spain or even stand with them in an attempt to hold at the Pyrenees.

Even more striking is his discussion of the medium term plan, which called for the defense of Europe at positions behind the Rhine:

> . . . during the discussions . . . one idea was paramount, though never openly expressed. Each of the participants . . . wanted a sector which would permit retreat. This was not cowardice, but merely prudence. In a sector permitting room to maneuver, one could hope to live to fight another day. . . . The center position was best; the force here could hope to retreat into France and perhaps make a stand farther back, if necessary, at the Pyrenees. [Ref. 194]

Although Hilsman does not cite specific references for these points, he does state that much of his material, presumably including these thoughts, was gained through interviews with key NATO military and civilian leaders. Is the situation in Europe today significantly different than it was in May 1950 in terms of the balance of forces on the Central Front? Today, theater nuclear weapons on each side tend to cancel out the credibility of a nuclear defense. In 1950, 12 Allied divisions faced 22 Soviet divisions. Today, 27 Allied divisions face 46 Warsaw Pact divisions. Although the size and firepower of the divisions have changed, the proportional balance remains roughly the same. If NATO strategy in 1950 was prudently considering a defense along the Pyrenees, should not such a strategy also be considered today?

E. CONCLUSIONS

From a purely military perspective, NATO strategists should seriously consider an alternative strategy for the defense of Central Europe. The credibility of a defense based on forward strategy is widely considered to be questionable. Spanish accession will do nothing to make that strategy more credible, but will open new options for an alternative strategy. Regardless of whether a general war in Europe were fought with conventional or nuclear weapons, the side which most

effectively mobilizes and deploys its reserves may end up the victor. The Soviet Union, with its shorter, overland, interior lines of communication, has a decided advantage over NATO in this respect. This advantage could be neutralized, however, by a NATO strategy for a collapsing defense along the Central Front, with an ultimate fallback position at the Pyrenees. A planned and orderly withdrawal to the Pyrenees would ensure the survival of sufficient Allied forces to hold Iberia against superior Soviet forces until reinforcements from North America could be deployed. Possession of Iberia as a staging area would allow NATO to avoid a Normandy-type operation at the beginning of the counteroffensive.

Yet strategic military considerations have never been dominant in the shaping of NATO policy. As a free association of sovereign democratic states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must be sensitive to the political concerns of member nations. The birth of the strategy of forward defense was, after all, prompted by political considerations. Those considerations remain as important today as they were in September 1950.

The effective defense of Western Europe is dependent on the active participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance. The constituency of that democracy would not tolerate support of an organization which by plan adopted a strategy to forfeit a significant part of their population and territory to occupying forces. In correspondence with the author, Dr. Manfred von Nordheim of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, the research institute of West Germany's Christian Democratic Union, the issue has been put in perspective:

> It is utterly unthinkable that the Federal Republic of Germany would consider abandoning the strategy of Forward Defense. . . . I am sure that the question of West Germany's continued membership in NATO would be at risk if NATO would seriously contemplate the strategy of an in-depth defense. [Ref. 195]

The accession of Spain into NATO will, therefore, have no immediate effect on NATO strategy for the defense of Central Europe. NATO's present psychological stalemate concerning change in strategy will continue. It is widely suspected that the strategy of forward defense, coupled to flexible response, is no longer (if it ever was) a viable one for the defense of Europe given the existing balance of forces. Yet Europeans, and Americans to a lesser extent, have been so indoctrinated into the myth of insuperable Soviet land power that they refuse to develop forces adequate to pursue their chosen strategy, despite the fact that they would be able to do so with less cost in terms of percentage of manpower and GNP than the Soviets.

Further, existing political realities will not permit any formal debate on alternative strategies which would require a smaller commitment for a higher chance of success. Although political considerations will continue to dominate the formation of formal policy, pragmatic military strategists will find reasons to develop certain plans for pursuing other options in limited ways. Operation orders will be written which will include contingency plans for resupply through Spanish ports. Military studies of the strategic terrain of the Iberian peninsula will be conducted, and the results included in NATO files. More funds will be allocated for improvement of port facilities and the transportation infrastructure in Iberia. Joint exercises will be held between land and air forces of Spain and other NATO countries. Some NATO war materials

may be stockpiled in Spain. Perhaps twenty years from now a retired NATO general will give an interview in which he alludes to unspoken plans for a contingency defense of Europe along the Pyrenees. But none of this will be spoken of openly or formally within the North Atlantic Council or the Defense Planning Council.

Yet, Spanish accession will have a more subtle effect on the credibility of the NATO security guarantee. One of the traditional strong points of Western military organizations has been the initiative of the leadership and the ability to improvise. With the minimum of advance planning outlined above, it is quite plausible that a defense at the Pyrenees could be extemporaneously executed in the event that forward defense positions proved untenable. This possibility alone will be sufficient to cause the Soviet Union additional uncertainty regarding the success of any aggressive move into Western Europe. Thus Spain's accession will add immediately to the credibility of NATO's deterrent, if not to its defense, along the Central Front.

VI. ANALYSIS OF THE BILATERAL ISSUES

A. WHY NO GREAT DEBATE?

Given the magnitude of the bilateral issues discussed in the preceding chapters, the Spanish accession process might have been expected to proceed quite slowly. Instead, it is approaching completion quite rapidly. The Soviet Union tried to slow the process through direct pressure on Spain, through pressure on Alliance members, and through interference in Spanish politics, but failed. Long-standing problems with Britain concerning settlement of the Gibraltar issue remain unresolved, yet neither Spain nor Britain attempted to use the accession question to gain leverage on the Gibraltar issue during the application debate in Spain or the ratification debate in Britain. Portuguese and Spanish pride did not clash during the accession process. The dialogue between the two nations concerning the future role of Spain in the Alliance has, in fact, been surprisingly conciliatory. The Federal Republic of Germany has remained one of Spain's strongest supporters within the Alliance despite Soviet pressure and urging from other European Socialists to show solidarity with the PSOE in its opposition to NATO membership. All in all, the accession process has proceeded remarkably smoothly.

Although Spanish membership offers many strategic advantages for the Alliance, it has not been recognition of these advantages which has made the process so smooth. The advantages are not new; Spain's strategic contribution to NATO in 1982 is roughly the same as it would have been in 1949. Nor is recognition of the advantages new;

the United States argued from the beginning that Spain's strategic importance was more significant to NATO than its form of government, and that Spain should be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Failing to persuade its European allies, the U.S. consummated its own bilateral base rights agreement with Spain in 1953. Though they recognized the importance of this agreement to Western defense, NATO's Northern European states firmly continued to resist repeated American proposals for Spanish accession over a 30-year period. There have been no strategic developments during that time which have caused the Alliance suddenly to reevaluate the potential Spanish contribution to NATO.

In spite of the fact that NATO is primarily a security community, strategic issues have not determined the pace of the Spanish accession process. Instead, the concern which has preempted all other issues has been the preservation of democracy in Spain. This concern alone has produced an overwhelming consensus within the Alliance in favor of Spanish accession. Prior to the February 1981 coup attempt, the instability of the democracy was considered a liability in the process. Several member states feared a return to authoritarian rule in Spain. They argued that the Alliance should not proceed too quickly with the association, but should wait until the strength of the democracy had proven itself. Following the coup attempt, however, this perspective changed radically. The Spanish Government argued that membership in NATO would contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Spain, and Alliance members accepted this argument. The question became not "Can Spanish democracy prove strong enough to survive?" but "Can NATO membership help Spanish democracy survive?"

One of Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo's first steps in the domestic accession campaign was to hurry to Bonn seeking reassurances of German support. Certain Spanish newspapers had reported that following the coup attempt, support for Spanish entry was cooling throughout Europe. Recognizing that the Cortes would not vote favorably on the government's request to make application for NATO membership if there was any chance the application would be rejected, Calvo-Sotelo sought to discredit these reports quickly. Arguing in Bonn that the coup attempt underscored Spain's need to move quickly toward accession, Calvo-Sotelo asked for Chancellor Schmidt's support. He was not disappointed. At a joint press conference, Schmidt declared that the Federal Republic "would come out firmly in favor of it (accession) the moment Spain officially declares its position". [Ref. 196] Many of NATO's other leaders followed suit. By May, Secretary General Luns was able to announce that all members of the North Atlantic Council would welcome Spain's application.

Bilateral issues were tabled. Final settlement of the Gibraltar question was postponed until after accession. Spain and Portugal dropped demands for preconditions regarding reorganization of the NATO command structure. Discussion of the details of a future role for the Spanish Army was avoided while the debate was in progress.

The accession process timetable was determined by the schedule of meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Each of the states involved in the process, including Spain, clearly understood the limitations imposed by the schedule. The unwritten timetable became the driving engine of the accession process. The limiting date was the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial level, which

is held each May. If the formal process of accession were not completed before May 1983, Spain would have to wait another full year to be welcomed into the Alliance. The supporters of accession argued that this was too long.

To allow sufficient time for all members to ratify an invitation before the May 1982 meeting, Spain had to submit its application for membership prior to the December 1981 Ambassadorial level Council meeting. Thus the Calvo-Sotelo government had to complete the domestic popular and parliamentary debates on the accession question prior to December. The requirement to telescope the entire process into the short time available effectively preempted debate on all bilateral international political issues, which became seemingly peripheral as they were subordinated to the imperative for preserving democracy in Spain.

This does not mean that the bilateral issues were forgotten. On the contrary, it is likely that once formal ratification of Spanish membership is completed, debate on each of the issues will be reopened. Although they were unexpectedly preempted during the accession process, they will surface again, with potentially significant effects on Alliance cohesion.

B. BILATERAL ISSUES AND ALLIANCE COHESION

1. Spain and the Soviet Union

Of the four bilateral relationships discussed in this thesis, the Soviet-Spanish relationship will have the least long term significance for Alliance cohesion. Soviet failure to create greater controversy over the accession question in Western Europe was a reflection

of the general deterioration of Western interest in détente during the 1979-1981 period. Success (whether or not it can be attributed to Soviet initiatives) on the nuclear arms issue in Spain was a reflection of increasing concern throughout Europe over the reliance of NATO strategy on nuclear deterrence and defense coupled with the realization that, if deterrence were to fail, the continent could become a nuclear battleground in a Soviet-American war. Once Spanish integration into NATO is complete, Soviet interest in Spain will be no greater than in other Alliance states, and Soviet initiatives intended to influence developments in Spain will be only part of broader efforts to influence liberal European thought in general. The Soviet-Spanish relationship will become merely another facet of the East-West relationship.

Support for regional movements in Spain will not give the Soviets additional leverage over the Spanish Government. In fact, it may work to the advantage of right-of-center politicians, who may continue to use Soviet interference to increase public awareness of the Soviet threat, and thus increase public support for a Western-oriented instead of a neutral position in international relations. Regional autonomy movements in Spain date from before the 15th century. They are manifestly nationalistic. They are unrelated to the East-West struggle and the Soviets will find that, like certain Middle-East states, the regional factions will accept Soviet aid when it suits their purpose, but will not accept lingering Soviet influence.

Even if failure to deal successfully with regional movements should lead to a change in government in Spain, the Soviets may find a new government no more responsive to Soviet influence than the

present government. Both the PSOE and the PCE have strongly rejected Soviet interference in Spain's internal affairs. If the Spanish electorate becomes convinced of Soviet complicity in terrorist activities, it is very possible that the PSOE and even the PCE may, like the Italian Communist Party, come to support Spanish membership in NATO as a means of preserving the balance of power in Europe and checking Soviet hegemony. This would weaken Soviet influence in Spain still further.

2. Spain, the Federal Republic, and Central Front Strategy

By itself, the question of a Spanish role in NATO strategy for the defense of the Central Front is not now, and will not become, a major issue. Spain cannot provide NATO with sufficient additional conventional forces to make the strategy of forward defense credible, yet the political commitment of the Federal Republic of Germany to the forward defense strategy makes any proposal for an alternative strategy a non-issue. Spanish accession virtually will have no effect on Central Front defense strategy planning.

A major associated issue which will have continuing importance within NATO, however, is the need to provide the Spanish Army with a meaningful role in Alliance defense plans. Leaders of the Alliance states are convinced, like the Spanish government, that such a role must be found if Spain's Armed Forces are to assume an external defense perspective. They will support Spanish efforts to identify such a role for the same reasons that they have supported acceleration of the accession process. The problem will require an imaginative solution. It will not be easy to redirect Army attention away from the

traditional internal security and Southern Front perspectives toward Europe. Portuguese democracy faced a similar but less severe problem in 1975. The commitment of a brigade to Southern Europe was the price which the Portuguese government willingly paid for NATO assistance in upgrading the equipment and training of its Army. Spain's Army is much larger and much more conservative than Portugal's was in 1975. Funds for military assistance are less available and competition among NATO's less developed nations for such funds is greater. Without the promise of upgraded equipment as an incentive, Spain's military leaders will see little serious reason to become concerned with the defense of the Italian Alps or the Northern German plains.

NATO and Spain will have to find alternative incentives, which could take the form of ranking positions on various NATO staffs, or concessions regarding NATO defense commitments for the Spanish enclaves in North Africa. In spite of the Spanish Government's efforts to reform and upgrade its Armed Forces, it will take at least a decade to complete the Army's transition to its new role.

3. Spain, Britain, and Gibraltar

More important to NATO over the long term will be the ultimate resolution of the Gibraltar question. As discussed in Chapter III, the triangular relationship in that situation makes it virtually impossible to identify a solution which is satisfactory to all three of the involved parties. The intransigence of the Gibraltarian population and of the Spanish conservative right further exacerbates the situation. The issue cannot help but trouble NATO now and in the future, for the status of the former colony is definitely in transition, although any change in the situation can only be temporary and "satisficing".

If the North Atlantic Council choses to reject a role in the administration of Gibraltar, there is a real possibility that further negotiations will end in stalemate, creating a rift between Spain and Britain. If the Council chooses to accept a role in the temporary administration of the peninsula it will be accepting a large share of the burden for a final settlement of the issue. The only hope of a permanently acceptable solution lies in the hope that over time tne Gibraltarians will soften their resistance to Spanish sovereignty. At best, that is a distant hope. At worst, it might never come about. In any case, the issue is likely to be a constant source of friction within the Alliance for many years to come.

4. Spain and Portugal

The relationship with the most significant long term implications for NATO cohesion will be the Portuguese-Spanish relationship. Alliance politicians will need to be continually sensitive to the subtleties of this relationship. To characterize the relationship as similar to the Greek-Turkish relationship would be excessive. No one would suggest that Spain is Portugal's greatest enemy, yet there are some parallels. Distrust and animosity are not elements of the relationship as they are in the Eastern Mediterranean, but uneasiness and sensitivity are terms that accurately describe the situation.

Resolution of the command reorganization question will not end the problem. There always will be other decisions facing NATO where the prestige and pride of two nations will be involved, and the potential will be high for unintentional or unavoidable offense to one or the other. For example, Portugal fears that Spanish competition for

military assistance may jeopardize NATO's commitment to upgrade its Armed Forces. Like the Spanish, the Portuguese feel that the stability of their democracy is linked to maintenance of high morale in the military. Demoralization in the Army was widespread prior to the 1974 coup as a result of a succession of colonial defeats. It only has been recently that the Council of the Revolution has placed most of its authority in the hands of the elected government. NATO aid is therefore viewed as essential to the consolidation of democracy. [Ref. 197] The Spanish face an identical problem, and the needs of both nations are undeniably legitimate. Yet with funds for assistance limited, some hard choices face NATO defense planners. The decisions are bound to offend one or both of the Iberian states.

There are other aspects of the relationship which tend to bind the two states together, however. The most important of these is the mutual support for democracy which each state provides to the other. Just as the dictatorships of Salazar and Franco tended to be mutually supportive, so too are the present democratic governments. The comments of Portuguese defense analyst Alvaro Vasconcelos, previously quoted in Chapter IV, are representative of the Portuguese viewpoint:

> The accession of Spain to the Alliance is, from the Portuguese point of view, both desirable and necessary. First, because NATO will thereby be reinforced, which is in the interest of Portugal. Secondly, because of the bearing that accession may have on the consolidation of the democracy in Spain. Nothing would be more harmful to Portugal than a new dictatorship in Spain, with a consequent situation of instability along the common border. [8] [Ref. 198]

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[8]The reference to "instability along the common border" recalls the sanctuary given to the militant supporters of the ousted Caetano regime by Franco in 1974 and 1975.

Should the Portuguese and Spanish agree to construct a combined staff for coordination of the defense of Iberia, over time this also will help to improve relations and create understanding between the two. Despite the negative aspects of the relationship which will require the attention of NATO leaders, the positive aspects which bind the two together will prove stronger in time.

5. Interlocking Relationships

Bilateral relationships cannot be isolated from the complex miltilateral relationships in which all Alliance members participate. The interaction between the resolution of the Gibraltar problem and the development of a new maritime command structure within NATO offers one illustration of interaction. Any changes to the existing structure will involve concessions or opportunities for each of the nations affected. For example, should the western boundary of SACEUR's maritime command be extended into the Gulf of Cadiz to accomodate the Spanish and British, some form of compensation might be demanded by the Portuguese. This could come in the form of increased pressure to incorporate the Azores within the Iberian Atlantic Command, request for preferential allocation of military assistance aid, demands for greater infrastructure development support in Portugal, or even demands for additional compensation from the United States in return for use of Portuguese military facilities. Redirection of funds to meet these demands would require other concessions by those who are competing for the same assets.

The question of NATO commitment to the defense of Spain's North African enclaves, which the Alliance would prefer to avoid, is closely linked to the bilateral relationships. Already discussed is the

possibility that Spain's military may put pressure on the government to demand NATO participation in the defense of the enclaves as a quid pro quo for Spanish Army commitments in Southern or Western Europe. The Gibraltar problem also is relevant, for there is a strong parallel between Spain's claim to Gibraltar and the Moroccan claim to Melilla, Ceuta, and the smaller enclaves. Resolution of the Gibraltar question in favor of Spain could set a precedent which the Moroccans would insist be followed in North Africa. NATO involvement in Gibraltar could place the Alliance in a position which jeopardizes its relations with Morocco.

As noted previously, Soviet initiatives in Spain will mirror broader initiatives throughout Europe aimed at influencing public opinion and government decisionmaking.

C. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES

Two interpretations are common regarding NATO's failure to achieve a unanimous consensus on every foreign policy issue. Some maintain that lack of cohesion within the Alliance demonstrates the fragility of NATO. NATO is seen as constantly on the verge of disintegration, lacking in effectiveness, and unable to meet its commitments. If one sees the Alliance in this light, the additional complications introduced into the complex multilateral relations of the Alliance by Spanish accession could appear as an intolerable burden upon NATO.

On the other hand, some stress the continued survival of NATO despite the many complex issues which divide its members as evidence of the strength and vitality of the Alliance. The members' ability to manage differences without destroying the effective performance of the security pact is seen as a great achievement, evidence that the underlying ties

which bind the states together are stronger than the disputes which sometimes receive more current attention. From this perspective, the issues raised by Spanish accession need not be particularly troublesome.[9]

The latter viewpoint is closer to the truth. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has survived much more difficult confrontations. Soviet influence with the Basque separatist ETA is mirrored by a similar Soviet association with the militant element of the Irish Republican Army and, to a lesser degree, with a separatist movement in Corsica which troubles France. Neither of these associations has degraded NATO effectiveness or support in the countries affected.

The relationship between Portugal and Spain has a parallel in the relationship between France and the United States. In both cases a state which has been an historical equal but is at present clearly inferior strategically seeks to avoid submerging its identity in that of the currently stronger ally. French pride and nationalism ultimately led to that nation's withdrawal from the NATO command structure, a situation which NATO would surely not desire to see repeated in the Portuguese case. Yet NATO survived in spite of French withdrawal. The withdrawal of Portugal's limited forces would be a much less severe blow to the Alliance than the withdrawal of French forces.

In any case, Portuguese incentive for withdrawal is much lower than French, for withdrawal would actually decrease rather than increase the

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[9]For a discussion of these two perspectives, see van Campen, S.I.P., "NATO: A Balance Sheet After Thirty Years," Orbis, v. 23, no. 2, pp. 261-62 and 264-67, Summer 1979

nation's prestige relative to Spain in the Western community. Portugal cannot dream of becoming the focal point of a third power center between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as France hoped to become. Portugal would lose through withdrawal, while NATO, though weakened, could survive. It is unlikely that Portugal would consider withdrawing from the Alliance as a result of friction with Spain.

Although a dispute between two member states over sovereignty in a former colonial possession will be new to NATO experience, the trauma of the postcolonial period for several Alliance members, especially France and Portugal, far exceeds the trauma of the Gibraltar question. Both Spain and Britain sincerely are seeking a solution to the problem. The Gibraltarians, although intransigent and a likely future irritant in Alliance relations, are not significant enough to cause a serious break in the Alliance. Just as Britain was able to force the Peliza government in Gibraltar to tone down its integration rhetoric during the reconciliation process, so will it be able to keep future friction at a manageable level while a solution is evolving.

When viewed from an historical perspective, the bilateral issues surrounding Spanish accession are not traumatic enough to threaten the stability of NATO. Undoubtedly they will cause diplomatic concern in Europe and America from time to time, but the problems will not be overwhelming. Even now the issues are eclipsed by more important questions surrounding intermediate nuclear weapons policy and the events in Poland. In the long term, the problems which Spain brings to NATO will be far outweighed by the advantages which accompany its accession.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. GENERAL OVERVIEW

Spain is moving steadily toward a position of full participation in the community of Western democratic nations. Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which could come as early as April 1982, will be a major milestone in that process. The North Atlantic Council has voted to extend a membership invitation to Spain; formal ratification of the invitation by NATO's 15 member states is the only stage of the accession process not yet complete.

The completion of the process will be a diplomatic victory for the majority Union del Centro Democratica Party. The party of Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo has staked a great deal of its prestige on the NATO question, and clearly expects too that its control of the government will be strengthened when membership is finally secured. Yet the accession process has not proceeded without difficulty, for Spain's move away from isolation has brought it into conflict with the interests of several other nations. This thesis has focused on four bilateral relationships where conflicts of interest have arisen, attempting to show how each of the relationships has affected the accession process, and how it may affect Alliance cohesion in the future.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Chapter II discusses the relationship between Spain and the Soviet Union with regard to the accession process. It examines the way in which Soviet interests were affected by Spain's move toward NATO and

reviews Soviet attempts to hinder the process of accession through direct influence of the Spanish Government, through pressure on the members of the Alliance, and through interference in the domestic Spanish political process.

Soviet efforts to influence the process have failed. The European community has been indifferent to Soviet arguments that the balance of power will be adversely affected by Spanish accession, or that Spanish membership in the Alliance will mark the beginning of a new period of hostility and the end of détente. The Soviet position has been eroded by a general deterioration of Western interest in détente owing to events in Afghanistan and Poland during the period of the accession debate. Direct Soviet attempts to influence the Spanish Government have been even less successful. The government was able to take advantage of popular reaction against Soviet interference in Spanish affairs by turning Communist rhetoric back against domestic opponents of NATO membership.

However, the domestic political process in Spain has produced some developments more pleasing to the Soviets. Most significant was the UCD government promise to prohibit the deployment or storage of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil. There also was a strong parallel between Soviet anti-NATO propaganda and the anti-bloc positions of the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party and the Spanish Communist Party. But the degree to which Soviet initiatives were responsible for these developments clearly was limited. The anti-nuclear position taken by Spanish liberals merely reflected a similar trend in liberal thought throughout Europe, and the anti-bloc positions of the PSOE and PCE were arrived at independently rather than as a function of Soviet influence.

The only possible leverage remaining to the Soviets revolves around support for Spanish separatist movements. If the Calvo-Sotelo government is able to weather any crisis which might be precipitated by terrorist activity until the process of accession is complete, even this avenue for influence will be closed. The Soviets will find that, even if the UCD government falls at a later time, a PSOE government will be no more receptive to Soviet overtures than the current UCD government. Soviet opportunities for disruption of NATO cohesion through Spain will therefore not be particularly troublesome to the Alliance.

Chapter III discusses the question of sovereignty over Gibraltar. In April 1980, it appeared that the nearly three century-old dispute might be nearing resolution as the British and Spanish Governments jointly announced the Lisbon Accords for the reopening of the border between Spain and Gibraltar. Yet there was no further progress following the announcement of the Accords, and the border remained sealed. It appeared that the intransigence of the conservative Spanish right might destroy the progress which had been made, and drive a wedge between Spain and Britain, threatening Spanish accession to NATO. Yet in the last few months of 1981, signs of progress again appeared. April 20, 1982, was agreed upon as a firm date for the reopening of the border.

This chapter reviews the history of the dispute, explaining the interests and arguments of each of the parties affected, and discussing what has happened to make progress on the issue possible after so long a stalemate. Finally, it presents the options which have been considered

for possible resolution of the conflict and discusses how NATO might be involved in a final solution.

The solution currently being considered revolves around use of the NATO command structure as a framework for an interim solution acceptable to all parties. The critical question for NATO to consider is the ultimate formulation of a more permanent solution. The Alliance should be very cautious about assuming too great a share of that responsibility, for there is no quick solution to the problem. Only over time can Spain, Britain, and NATO hope that an acceptable sclution will evolve. In the meantime, NATO cohesion will be served best by limiting NATO involvement.

Chapter IV discusses the historic relationship between Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese "Atlantic Perspective" reflects five centuries of national development, and Portugal has had a monopoly on strategic control of the Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean and Central Europe since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. Spanish entry into NATO threatens to end that monopoly and weaken Portuguese leverage within the Alliance. Spanish entry also reawakens a centuries-old Portuguese fear that its individual identity will be submerged in that of its bigger and stronger Iberian neighbor.

This chapter focuses on problems surrounding the restructuring of the NATO military command to accomodate Spanish accession, and the interaction between this effort and Portuguese interests. It also goes beyond the command structure problem to discuss how longer term NATO issues will be affected by the Portuguese-Spanish relationship. With regard to the command structure question, military command effectiveness will be a consideration secondary to political interests in

the creation of a new command structure. The final proposal accepted by the Defense Planning Committee will be the one which requires the lowest cost in political concessions from the concerned states, rather than the one which is most effective strategically. This precedent probably will be followed when Spanish and Portuguese interests conflict concerning future defense planning issues, and for this reason the Portuguese-Spanish relationship carries the greatest long term significance for the Alliance.

Chapter V considers NATO's need for a greater credibility for its Central Front defense strategy in the context of the Spanish Government's eagerness to find a meaningful role for its Army within NATO. The chapter explores the possibility that the coincidence of the two problems might present opportunities for simultaneous resolution of both. The chapter presents an outline of current defense strategy and discusses its weaknesses. The strategic assets which Spanish accession will bring to NATO are examined with regard to the contribution they might make to the defense of the Central Front. Spain's possible contribution is analyzed in two ways: first, in terms of making the present strategy more credible, and secondly, in terms of alternative strategies which accession might make possible.

Unfortunately, Spanish accession will not improve NATO's position on the Central Front. The contribution which Spanish forces might make to the Central Front will not be sufficient to improve the credibility of the present strategy, while the commitment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Alliance to forward defense will not allow alternative strategies to be considered seriously. The political interests of the Federal Republic will be the primary obstacle to a reevaluation of

defense strategy which might otherwise follow Spanish accession. Nonetheless, it is demonstrated that, although Spanish accession will not add significantly to the credibility of NATO defense, it will contribute effectively to the credibility of the NATO deterrent.

Chapter VI synthesizes the effects of the various bilateral issues on the accession process. These issues did not affect the process radically because concern for the stability of democracy in Spain preempted bilateral international issues following the February 1981 coup attempt in Madrid. Although their influence during the accession process was limited, the issues will have a future bearing on Alliance decision making processes, with the Gibraltar and Portuguese issues the most significant. Yet though these issues will create additional discord in Alliance dialogue, they probably will have no great effect on future Alliance cohesion. Compared to other controversies which the Alliance has survived, the issues which Spanish accession brings to NATO are manageable. The integrity of the Alliance will not be threatened by Spanish membership, and could even be strengthened.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY

There is little in the way of positive action which the United States can or should do relative to these issues. The relationships do not lend themselves to outside arbitration. Instead, what will be demanded of U.S. leaders is awareness and understanding of the issues involved.

Particularly in the case of the Spanish-Portuguese relationship, American civilian and military leaders frequently will find themselves contributing to decisions on issues in which Spanish and Portuguese interests clash. Several possible examples have been mentioned already;

military assistance, military command structure reorganization, Iberian infrastructure development, and arms purchase agreements. Outside of the NATO framework, bilateral agreements on trade, economic aid, technological development, and even base rights agreements will have a bearing on the Spanish-Portuguese relationship. Like an executive negotiating the salaries of two managers with similar responsibilities, the United States will have to avoid making too many concessions to one out of concern for offending the other, or creating precedents on which the other may capitalize.

The Gibraltar situation will demand patience from U.S. leaders, who must recognize that only time can provide a permanent solution to the problem. The U.S., and the other NATO nations, will best serve the cause of the Alliance by standing back and allowing the Spanish, British, and Gibraltarians to proceed at their own pace.

In the matter of the Spanish Army's role in NATO, the United States' best opportunity for a positive contribution will be at the military staff level, where recommendations will be formulated for presentation to NATO's Defense Planning Council. By ensuring that its representatives to these staff positions are fully aware of all the issues involved, the U.S. will best serve its own and Alliance interests. Once the staff members are properly prepared for their assignments, only their own imagination and judgment can provide the final solution.

Against Soviet interference, NATO's best defense will remain an emphasis on the common principles of sovereignty, democracy, and freedom which have held the Alliance together for 33 years. Whatever other issues divide the Alliance, the Soviet Union will not be able to tear

apart the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if its members keep faith with those principles and with each other.

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